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ABSTRACT
 UNITY IN DIVERSITY? MULTICULTURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKISH ACCESSION
Meagan Anne Beltekoğlu
European Studies, MA, 2010
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Keywords: EU, Turkey, Turkish membership, Multiculturalism 
This thesis analyzes the experiences of the United Kingdom, France, and the 
Netherlands with multiculturalism, tying the experiences of each country with its 
diverse population to its position on Turkish accession to the European Union. It 
proposes that the lack of an EU level policy on multiculturalism is reflected onto the 
debate surrounding the Turkish bid to join the EU.  Due to the lack of an EU level 
policy, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands have taken different 
approaches to incorporating minority populations into society which have affected the 
member states' position on Turkey. It proposes that the member states which have 
implemented more multicultural policies (the UK and the Netherlands) are staunch 
supporters of Turkey at the governmental level whereas the member state that has 
enacted a more assimilationist policy (France) is strongly opposed to Turkish 
membership. 
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ÖZET
FARKLILIKLARDA BİRLEŞMEK? AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NDE ÇOKKÜLTÜRLÜLÜK 
VE BUNUN TÜRKİYE’NİN ÜYELİĞİ ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ
Meagan Anne Beltekoğlu
Avrupa Çalışmaları, MA, 2010
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, Türkiye, Türkiye’nin üyeliği, Çokkültürlülük
Bu tez; İngiltere, Fransa ve Hollanda’nın çokkültürlülük deneyiminlerini, 
herbirinin farklı kültürlerden oluşan toplumsal yapısıyla ilgili tutumunu Türkiye’nin 
Avrupa Birliği adaylığına yaklaşımıyla bağdaştırarak ele almaktadır. Tez, AB düzeyinde 
bir çokkültürlülük politikasının mevcut olmamasının Türkiye’nin AB’ye girme çabaları  
çerçevesindeki tutumlarda açık bir şekilde ortaya çıktığını ileri sürmektedir. Bu yönde 
bir AB politikasının eksikliği sebebiyle; İngiltere, Fransa ve Hollanda azınlık grupların 
topluma dahil edilmesiyle ilgili farklı yaklaşımlar sergilemişlerdir ve bu durum üye 
ülkelerin Türkiye’ye yönelik tutumunu etkilemektedir. Tez, çokkültürcü politikalar 
benimseyen ülkeler (İngiltere ve Hollanda) devlet düzeyinde Türkiye’nin kuvvetli 
destekçileri olurken, assimilasyoncu politika izleyen bir üye ülkenin (Fransa) 
Türkiye’nin güçlü aleyhtarı olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. 
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) is far from solely a regional economic union. 
However, it is also far from a political union. Comprised of 27 member states, the EU 
consists of numerous nationalities, ethnic groups, languages and religions, clearly 
making it also an experiment of multiculturalism. The absence of a supranational policy 
related to multiculturalism has allowed the member states to develop their own 
multicultural policies. This thesis addresses the experiences of the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Netherlands with multiculturalism, tying the experiences of each 
country with its diverse population to its position on Turkish accession to the EU. 
This thesis proposes that the lack of an EU level policy is reflected onto the 
debate surrounding the Turkish bid to join the EU. It aims to address several questions: 
Why is Turkey's membership bid tied to multiculturalism? To what extent has the 
prominence of Turkey's cultural and religious differences in the debate over Turkish 
membership impacted the Turkish path to membership? How is the debate on 
multiculturalism reflected in Turkey's bid for membership?  
While the motto of the EU is “unity in diversity”, which would seem to embrace 
Turkey's distinctiveness, Turkey's cultural and religious differences have been made an 
issue by politicians in the member states. Some member states see the EU as a 
“Christian Club” to which Turkey does not belong; others question whether or not 
Turkey lies within the borders of Europe and shares common European values. In 
addition, as the member states are still trying to manage their increasingly diverse 
populations, they are concerned that Turkish membership would bring an influx of 
Turkish immigrants. As there is no EU level policy related to multiculturalism, these 
issues stem from the different approaches to multiculturalism in the EU member states. 
Furthermore, the French and Dutch “no” votes on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 
were regarded as a rejection of Turkish membership, demonstrating that public opinion 
also plays a role here.
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This study suggests that the support or hostility toward Turkish membership is 
linked to domestic experiences with multiculturalism. This is one of the starting points 
of this thesis. State policy on multiculturalism, speeches of national politicians, and 
public opinion on multiculturalism and Turkish accession will be looked at in order to 
determine how these issues are conceived in the member states. Three member states 
have been selected for analysis based on their diverse domestic experiences and 
approaches to multiculturalism. Great Britain, a proponent of Turkish accession, has 
implemented a more multicultural policy towards immigrants, allowing them to 
embrace their identities. In contrast, France, struggling to deal with its large, mainly 
Muslim immigrant population, has pursued a policy of assimilation and 
homogenization, stemming from the unitary character of the French state. The long 
tradition of multiculturalism in the UK and of assimilation in France makes them good 
cases for testing the link between domestic experiences with multiculturalism and the 
position on Turkish membership. The Netherlands has been selected as well, as it is the 
only member state to have officially declared itself to be a multicultural state. The 
position of the Netherlands falls in between the positions of France and the UK: the 
legacy of the pillarization system brought about a unique approach to multiculturalism 
where the immigrants were encouraged to retain their native identities. However, the 
Dutch government has since moved away from this position and has, following a series 
of crises, employed a more integrationist approach based on civic integration. 
Germany is another member state which stands out for its opposition to Turkish 
membership and its diverse population. However, the case of Germany will not be 
considered in this thesis for two main reasons. For one, more Turks live in Germany 
than in any other European country.1 The aim of this thesis is not to examine the 
experience of Turks living in Europe or the government's approach to them, but to link 
the domestic approach to multiculturalism to the position on Turkish enlargement. Due 
to the high number of Turks in Germany, it is likely that the German government's 
approach to multiculturalism and its opposition to Turkish membership have been 
colored by its experience with the Turks. The other countries’ immigrant populations are 
much more diverse and therefore, it is expected that the bias against Turks is less in 
1 Approximately 27 per cent of the foreign population in Germany is Turkish whereas in 
the Netherlands it is 15 per cent, in France 6 per cent, and in the UK 2 per cent. See 
Appendix 2 for more information. 
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these member states. Furthermore, the German approach to multiculturalism is more 
exclusionary (Carens, 2000; Kucukcan, 2002) than multicultural and therefore will not 
fit in the parameters of this study.
The experiences of these member states with multiculturalism have impacted 
their views on Turkish membership. An analysis of these member states’ policy on and 
approach to multiculturalism might contribute to a better understanding of the varying 
opinions on the Turkish bid to join the EU.  Somewhat surprisingly, there is a lack of 
research on the relationship between multiculturalism and enlargement. The literature 
that does exist is focused on the related issues of immigration, migration, minority 
rights, language, and foreign policy. Therefore, it is not unexpected that there also is a 
shortage of research connecting multiculturalism and Turkish accession. While much 
research has been done on the issues of culture and religion in relation to Turkish 
accession (Onis, 1999; Nicolaidis, 2004, Grigoriadis, 2006) a detailed look at 
multicultural regimes and experiences and their link to the position on Turkish 
membership is an area that has been overlooked and could add to the ongoing debate 
over Turkey.
Tied to the issue of multiculturalism is immigration. Europe has a long history 
with immigration. Immigration increased dramatically at the end of World War II and 
following the decolonization of the European empires. The influx of immigrants from 
outside the EU started at this time. The immigration of 'third-country nationals' and the 
later internal migration within the EU has created a more diverse and multicultural  
citizenry. Each member state has had a different experience with multiculturalism which 
has resulted in the emergence of multiple formulas on how to best deal with the 
challenges facing multicultural societies. These formulas include provisions related to 
immigration, integration, race relations, discrimination, and citizenship. The varying 
views on and experiences of the member states with multiculturalism are reflected in 
their positions on enlargement. 
This paper will explore the relationship between the multiple methods on dealing 
with multiculturalism in the member states and the impact of these formulas on the 
Turkish candidacy. The first chapter will look at the concept of multiculturalism in 
detail: the different theories of multiculturalism, the rationale for the different policies,  
and the criticism of multiculturalism will be considered. It will also discuss the different 
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ways that immigrants have been incorporated into society. 
Chapter two will focus on the British method of multiculturalism which has been 
influenced by both its own internal diversity as well as its system of indirect rule in the 
British Empire. The British approach to multiculturalism was codified through a series 
of acts related to race, nationality and immigration which tolerated and encouraged 
diversity and equality. Several instances of rioting, the Rushdie Affair, and the 
international terrorist attacks in the 2000s resulted in a slight change of policy in the 
UK, where an overarching identity and set of values now accompanies British 
citizenship. The recent events have impacted both British public opinion of 
multiculturalism as well as the British position on Turkish membership. The government 
firmly supports Turkey while the public, with the recent crises still fresh in their 
memory, is less sure. 
The third chapter examines the case of France. The French do not employ a 
system of multiculturalism like the British do; rather, the influence of the republican 
values which grew out of the French Revolution drives the French predilection for more 
monocultural and assimilatory policies. In the French system, citizenship takes priority 
over ethnicity, race, and religion which is in stark contrast to the British and Dutch 
approaches. French assimilatory policy aims to turn everyone who resides in France into 
a French citizen, erasing their native identity. Like in the British case, there were also 
several crises in France. While the government has continued its opposition to both 
multiculturalism and Turkish membership, the French people seem to be more 
supportive of diversity. For the most part, the public follows the government line on 
Turkish membership, in that it is opposed to it, but a good deal of the French are also 
ambivalent toward this issue. 
Chapter four details the Netherlands' unique approach to multiculturalism and its 
recent turn toward civic integration. The Dutch were revered for their immigrant-
friendly policies, said to be a legacy of its pillarization system, which encouraged 
immigrants to retain their native identities and cultures. However, for a variety of 
reasons which are discussed in the chapter, the Netherlands began to implement more 
civic integration policies with the aim of promoting active citizenship and participation.  
Two assassinations contributed to the popularity of the already rising right-wing parties 
in the Netherlands. Despite this, most of the Dutch government is extremely supportive 
4
of Turkish membership and the public too displays higher levels of support. 
Chapter five looks at the issue of multiculturalism at the EU level. While there is 
no EU level policy on multiculturalism, the motto of the EU, “unity in diversity” and the 
treaties call for the EU to contribute to the flowering of national cultures. The EU 
officials, in line with the obligations of the treaties, espouse support for multiculturalism 
in their speeches and support Turkish membership once all conditions are met. Finally, 
the last chapter summarizes the main findings of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1: Multiculturalism
Has, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel put it, the “notion of multiculturalism 
fallen apart”2? While it may not have fallen apart completely, it is certainly in crisis. 3 A 
catchword in the 1980s and 1990s, multiculturalism has since become a source of 
contention in Europe due to the various approaches and recent crises attributed to it. 
But, what exactly is multiculturalism? What are the different ways multicultural policies  
are enacted? This chapter aims to address these questions. 
Prior to looking at the impact of the different experiences of the EU member 
states with multiculturalism and how this is reflected in their views on Turkish 
membership, it is important to examine the concept of multiculturalism more in detail.  
First, multiculturalism will be defined and policies and concepts related to 
multiculturalism will be discussed. Then, the criticism of multiculturalism will be 
looked at. The second section will explore the different ways that minority populations 
have been incorporated into the member states: multiculturalism, integration, and 
assimilation. As the EU is a multicultural entity, consisting of different states, 
nationalities, languages, cultures and religions, but an EU level policy does not exist in 
this area, it is important to examine this issue at the member state level. This thesis aims 
to show that the varying policy approaches related to multiculturalism and the 
experiences of the member states with their increasingly multicultural societies have 
influenced their positions on Turkish membership.
2 Quoted in Charles Bremmer, “Stoned to Death...Why Europe Is Starting to Lose its 
Faith in Islam,” Times Online, 4 December 2004. 
3 See, for example, Parekh, 2002; Glazer, 1993; Modood, 2008. 
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1.1. What is Multiculturalism? 
Taken at face value, the term 'multiculturalism' seems easy to define: relating to 
more than one culture or ethnic group in a society. However, numerous scholars 
(Wieviorka, 1998; Willet, 1998; Brubaker, 2001; McGoldrick, 2005) point out the 
difficulty in elucidating the ambiguous concept which is mainly due to it being 
interpreted differently by different states in their policies and by politicians in order to 
serve their interests. As Cynthia Willet put it: 
the lack of a unifying theory [of multiculturalism] stems from the fact that 
multiculturalism as a political, social and cultural movement has aimed to 
respect a multiplicity of diverging perspectives outside of dominant traditions.4
The existence of multiculturalism can be attributed to the multiple ethnic, religious,  
cultural, and racial communities found in one society. Besides the obvious cultural 
connotation, the term multiculturalism is also used by women's rights, gay rights, and 
other activist groups which call for equal treatment of their members. In this thesis, the 
term multiculturalism will be used in relation to ethnic, cultural, national and religious  
differences. 
 Still, even with the conceptual space narrowed down to include only four out of 
many possible differences, the question of how to accurately and adequately define 
multiculturalism remains. The term itself is controversial and has different meanings at 
different levels and locations. As Dominic McGoldrick notes, it is “hard to define 
multiculturalism, because cultural identity is itself a dynamic, evolving organization that  
is often blurred with political identity and political ideology.”5 Likewise, a survey which 
asked a group of scholars to define multiculturalism received four different responses. 
The summary of the survey questioned if “anybody actually agrees what 
multiculturalism means – and is it a good or bad thing.”6
4  Cynthia Willet, Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate (Malden: 
Wiley- Blackwell, 1998) p. 1.
5 Dominic McGoldrick, “Multiculturalism and Its Discontents,” Human Rights Law 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2005): 28.
6 “So What Exactly Is Multiculturalism?” BBC Online, 4 April 2004. Available online 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3600791.stm. 
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Indeed, the globalized world has brought cultural, ethnic, national and religious 
groups physically closer together. This has resulted in increased interaction between 
these groups which has blurred boundaries and made them less distinct. Keeping this in 
mind, this paper will apply a simple definition of multiculturalism in order to avoid 
diverging too far from the topic at hand: “the condition in which ethnic, religious, or 
cultural groups coexist within one society.”7 The coexistence of these groups has 
presented a challenge to the member states in the EU. A particular problem is related not 
to the coexistence of these multiple groups, but to their ability to coexist harmoniously 
on the one hand and to have equal rights on the other. The most important obstacle for a 
multicultural society lies not only in defining what constitutes multicultural, but also,  
“in describing what constitutes the common heritage in European culture, while at the 
same time lauding (and promoting) the diversity of cultures.”8 The next section deals 
with the EU’s ability to create a multicultural society in Europe. 
1.1.1. Components of Multiculturalism 
The recent influx of immigrants into Europe has necessitated a democratic policy 
response to the deal with the newly diverse societies. The EU member states, while 
cooperating to a certain extent at the supranational level, are still organized communities  
who live by their own systems of beliefs and practices at the national level. They 
therefore took varying approaches to cope with diversity since there is no EU level 
policy in this area. Their approaches range from welcoming it to trying to assimilate 
minority groups into the mainstream culture. It is interesting to note that the EU’s 
adopted motto in 2000 was “unity in diversity”. The EU has fostered numerous policies 
to realize this objective, but so far has had limited success.9 
It is particularly important to tie the EU’s support for multiculturalism to the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. Democracy necessitates the recognition of all societal  
7 Washington Library of Congress quoted in Michel Wieviorka, “Is Multiculturalism the 
Solution?” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21, No. 5 (September 1998): 882. 
8 Enrique Banus, “Cultural Policy in the EU and the European Identity,” in European 
Integration in the 21st Century, edited by Mary Farrell, Stefano Fella, and Michael 
Newman. (London: Sage Publications 2002) p. 165.
9 This will be discussed in further detail in chapter five. 
8
groups which should be afforded equal rights of participation. The conditions of 
democracy stipulate equal recognition and equal status for minority populations, yet 
how this has been implemented has differed based on the traditions and experiences of 
each particular state. Some states such as the UK support a more essentialist model of 
identity, believing that identity can exist at multiple levels without necessarily having to  
change, while others such as France prefer the dynamic model in which identity can and 
should change to adapt to the host culture. How a state views the concept of identity is 
crucial for determining its stance on how minorities should be incorporated into society. 
Besides supporting multiculturalist or integration policies, which strive to help 
newcomers fit in and be productive in their host country, the states that back the 
essentialist model may also apply pluralism which calls for reciprocal recognition 
between the majority and minority groups, rather than recognition by the majority only 
as is usually practiced in multiculturalist policy. Those states which have a dynamic 
view of identity are more likely to support more assimilatory policies whereby 
minorities either become or are made similar to the mainstream culture. They may also 
attempt to implement differentialist policies that either indirectly and/or actively exclude  
minority groups. The wide array of policies implemented by the EU member states 
presents a substantial hurdle to forming a supranational policy on multiculturalism. 
A state's view of identity is largely tied to its view of nationalism and citizenship. 
Civic nations, which most likely subscribe to the essentialist model of identity, are 
considered to be ethnically neutral and membership is related to the principles of 
democracy and justice. Civic nations most often follow the jus soli, or the “law of 
ground” model of citizenship, where nationality and citizenship is based on birth in a 
state's territory. In contrast, ethnic nations have the goal of reproducing the ethno-
national culture which is associated with that particular nation-state and grant 
citizenship or nationality based on jus sanguinis, or the “right of blood” concept where 
having an ancestor who is a citizen is the determining factor. However, these 
classifications are not finite and some states employ a mixture of both. For example, 
while France initially followed jus soli policies, it later granted nationality upon birth in 
France only if other requirements were met. The UK also has a mixed policy whereas 
the Netherlands' nationality law is primarily based on jus sanguinis.
A state's view on identity, nationality, and citizenship combined with its 
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experience with minorities and its concept of the nation-state have all affected its 
experience with the immigrants and minorities who reside on its territory (Inglis, 1996). 
The waves of immigration that started with decolonization after World War II raised the 
question of how to live with, rather than expel, the strangers that had come to be found 
in most corners of Europe. Even though most European societies already consisted of 
multiple social groups, such as the Romani and ethnic Jews, it was not until a 
continuous influx of often visibly identifiable immigrants began that these societies 
were confronted with the issue of cohesion. 
Especially noteworthy in this aspect is the large-scale Turkish immigration into 
Europe which began in the 1960s. A steady stream of Turkish guest workers left their 
homes in Anatolia to work temporarily in Europe in order to fill the labor shortages and 
reap the economic benefits. Large numbers of Turks settled permanently in Europe, and 
much of today's concern over Turkish membership is related to the fact that many 
European countries have not “yet come to terms with the post-war influx of Turks,”10 as 
well as with the influx of immigrants from other areas. In short, many member states are 
still struggling with how to deal with their sizable minority population. 
The unstable world environment which ensued following the breakdown of the 
bipolar system at the end of the Cold War led to a new influx of refugees and asylum 
seekers in Europe from Africa and the Middle East. These immigrants were different 
than most of those who had previous migrated to Europe as they could also visibly be 
identified as immigrants due to their obvious racial and/or ethnic differences. In 
addition, some of them could easily be discerned by their cultural or religious dress; the 
hijab (the Islamic headscarf), the Sikh turban, or the West African dashiki were all 
telltale signs of an immigrant.
What is more, the issue of immigration was further complicated by globalization. 
The ease of movement and transfer of information facilitated by globalization and 
improvements in technology increased contact between cultures and elevated the 
importance of ethnicity. The cultural blending that occurred was a challenge to the 
identity of the majority and the foundation of the nation-state. This, along with the 
perception that some immigrants had failed to integrate, resulted in a widespread trend 
across Europe towards the resurgence of nationalism, an increase in racism and 
10 Sarah Schaefer, Greg Austin, and Kate Parker. “Turks in Europe: Why Are We 
Afraid?” The Foreign Policy Centre (London, September 2005): ii.
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xenophobia, and an upsurge in support for right-wing populist political parties, all of 
which have negatively impacted the policies towards immigrants. 
Since European nationhood is considered to be more ethnoculturally based 
(Koopmans et al., 2005), as Europe became more diverse, the claims of ethnic, religious 
and groups of different identities challenged the state. As the nation-state typically 
connotes, “a territory, a people, and a normative system (a law)...and implicitly a 
religion or a common religious heritage,”11 many states felt that the core of their 
existence was under attack due to the requests from these groups for recognition or 
benefits from the state. The minorities and the majority clashed over many issues such 
as language, religion, representation, education curriculum, and the recognition of 
minority festivals and holidays. Will Kymlicka describes the seriousness of these 
problems, suggesting that, “finding morally defensible and politically viable answers to 
these issues is the greatest challenge facing democracies today.”12 Indeed, as Kymlicka 
asserts, many EU member states have had difficulties in finding solutions to these 
obstacles. 
The EU member states have reacted to their multicultural societies, where 
several ethnic, religious, or cultural groups or communities often live side by side, in 
different ways. As there is no EU level policy on most of issues related to 
multiculturalism, the member states have been free to pursue their own state level 
policies in this area. Some, such as France and more recently the Netherlands, have 
responded to the perceived attack on the nation-state by nation-building: promoting the 
language of the majority as the common language and allowing access to state 
institutions based on language. In the opinion of Kymlicka (2001), by privileging the 
majority culture, the minority immigrants were left with three choices; to accept 
integration, to endeavor for the right to self-govern in order to maintain their culture, or 
to become marginalized. However, if a government chooses to not to recognize the 
minority groups, it is, as claimed by Charles Taylor (1994), putting them in the position 
of the “other” which will likely lead to further discrimination against minority groups.
Others, such as the United Kingdom, have followed more multiculturalist 
11 Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Multiculturalism,  
Muslims, and Citizenship: A European Approach, (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 2.
12 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 
(London: University of Oxford Press, 1996) p. 1.
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policies which typically include education, linguistic, social and economic components.  
These policies respect diversity and universal values and norms. Rather than promoting 
one myth of national origins, alternative versions of history may be taught. As it is 
understood that integration will not be immediate, the use of the native languages of the 
minorities is allowed. The overall goal of multicultural policies is to integrate 
immigrants, while at the same time respecting and recognizing their distinctiveness.
1.1.2. Criticism of Multiculturalism
By 2000, multiculturalism had become dominant in Europe. However, the 
preference for multiculturalism quickly came to an end in September 2001 following the 
terrorist attacks and the subsequent turn towards securitization in Europe. This brought 
multiculturalism into the spotlight. While some policies enacted under the banner of 
securitization were clearly discriminatory and had the effect of reducing tolerance and 
respect for minorities, with approximately 85 per cent of Europeans agreeing that there 
are either a lot or too many foreigners in Europe, these policies clearly had some degree 
of support.13 While multiculturalism was criticized in Europe before September 11 th, the 
subsequent discussion of the failure of some immigrants to integrate in the wake of the 
attacks renewed the dialogue on its deficiencies. 
Opponents of multiculturalism have found many faults with it. The main grounds 
for criticism is that multiculturalism actually prevents integration by allowing the 
differences between the minorities and the majority to continue to exist. By recognizing 
the uniqueness of groups and individuals and not encouraging them to assimilate, 
minorities remain “the other”. In attempt to combat racism and discrimination, anti-
discrimination policies and legislation which call for the differential treatment of 
minority groups may be viewed as preferential and unfair to the majority and in 
violation of the principle of equal treatment. If the majority perceives that the minority 
immigrant groups are being given opportunities that the majority is not, the already 
fragile relationship between the majority and the minority may be exacerbated and could 
foster social and ethnic conflict. The disunity that results from multicultural policies is  
13 Ash Amin, “Multi-ethnicity and the Idea of Europe,” Theory, Culture, and Society 
Vol. 21, No. 2 (2004) p. 8.
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seen as a threat to the social cohesion of a society (Kymlicka, 2001; Joppke, 2004). 
Instead of providing for a more diverse and inclusive community, critics claim 
that multiculturalism encourages fragmentation and the development of ghettos. In these 
parallel cities immigrants live completely separate lives and have limited interaction  
with the majority population. According to two staunch opponents of multiculturalism, 
it has “provided more problems than solutions.”14  Critics suggest that more assimilatory 
policies would provide for a more homogenous society; this values intergroup relations 
more than cultural maintenance. The absorption of minorities into the mainstream 
culture aims to eliminate what were grounds for conflict.
What is problematic in the member states' policies of multiculturalism are the 
inherent problems in terms of integration. The basic concept of multiculturalism, while 
respecting the distinctiveness of the minority groups, contains certain innate biases and 
issues. For one, it is biased toward Western civilization (Taylor, 1994; Parekh, 2002). 
While it usually does not call for outright assimilation, certain policies related to 
multiculturalism may privilege Western values over non-Western values. Critics have 
referred to multiculturalism as “cultural imperialism” (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1996; 
Goldrick, 2005) in that it forces, albeit indirectly, the minority to adapt to the ways of 
the majority, at least in some degree. For example, even in multicultural societies, the 
language, holidays and traditions are those of the majority. While some of the minority's 
customs may be recognized, it is more or less impossible for all cultures to be 
recognized as equal, calling into the question the supposed neutrality of the state. 
While September 11th may have been the spark to call into question the validity 
of multiculturalism, scholars had been critiquing it since the early 1990s. The economic 
downturn that began after September 11th drew attention to the fact that the non-
minorities who were suffering economically were being overlooked as policies 
disproportionately focused on minorities. In addition, the constant flow of immigrants, 
refugees, and asylum seekers had become a source of tension in many member states. 
The recent rise in support for right-wing political parties in many EU member 
states suggests that multiculturalism may have lost its steam as the solution (Rydgren, 
2005). Some right-wing parties have politicized the issues of immigration and 
multiculturalism and have connected them to the economic downturn, resulting in a 
14 Douglas Murray and Robin Simcox, “The Rotting Fruit of Multiculturalism,” The 
American Spectator, (December 2009/January 2010): 62.
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decrease in support for multiculturalist policies.15 Moreover, following September 11th 
and the attacks in London and Madrid, the belief that multiculturalism was either 
directly or indirectly responsible for domestic terrorism spread across the continent and 
attacks, albeit mostly minor, against Muslims grew (Meer and Modood, 2008). The 
“wholesale retreat from multiculturalism in Europe”16 was not entirely shocking as even 
before the rise of populists such as Pim Fortuyn of the Netherlands after the September 
11 attacks, some governments, such as the Dutch, had already started to turn away from 
multiculturalist policies. Indeed, as Koopmans et al. point out, “the last two decades 
have witnessed the rise and continued salience of right-wing extremist parties that have 
xenophobic and racist positions, or at least positions that are against the rights and 
interests of immigrants.”17 
The right-wing groups typically view cultural difference as being a major hurdle 
in achieving integration and social cohesion (Koopmans et al., 2005) and support the 
assimilation of the minorities. The desire to reevaluate and change the multiculturalist  
policies that were in place was mainly motivated by the perceived special treatment of  
the minorities as well as the growth of an undesirable ethnic underclass and 
deteriorating economic conditions. These issues, plus the wave of terrorist attacks, were 
taken advantage of by populists like Wilders, Le Pen and Fortuyn who called for “civic 
adjustments on the part of immigrants, which had been dodged under the reign of 
official multiculturalism.”18 More assimilatory policies and a turn towards civic 
nationalism have become commonplace as governments look to redress the 
shortcomings of multiculturalist policies. The next section addresses the different ways 
the challenges of multiculturalism are handled in the member states. 
15 For more information, see Rydgren, 2005.
16 Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and 
Policy,” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2004): 244. 
17 Ruud Koopmans, Paul Stathman, Marco Guigni, and Florence Passy, Contested 
Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005) p. 180. 
18  Joppke, “The Retreat,” p. 249.
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1.2. Multiculturalism in the Member States: Multiple Approaches19
Until a supranational regime regarding multiculturalism and integration is 
established, the member states will continue to be able to enact their own legislation in 
these areas. Common EU level approaches to the issue of integrating third-country 
nationals, an important component of multiculturalism, are currently in the process of 
being developed. Given the different histories, legal and civic traditions, demography, 
and experiences of the UK, France, and the Netherlands with immigrants, it is logical 
that they have implemented varying policies on incorporating minorities into society. It  
is important to recognize that policy models are executed differently based on the legal 
system and history of the state. The most important reason for the individual responses 
in dealing with multiculturalism is the absence of an EU level policy on these issues. As 
a consequence, the formulation of policies related to multiculturalism is left up to the 
individual member states.  
1.2.1. Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalist policies typically accept the minority culture and its  
distinctiveness. There are many models of multiculturalism in the EU; this thesis will  
narrow down its analysis to the cases of the UK, France and the Netherlands because of 
their unique approaches. The UK is well-known for its tolerance and the Netherlands for 
its (until recently) 'immigrant-friendly' policies. France, on the other hand, is infamous 
for its assimilationist tendencies and hostility toward immigrants. Multicultural policies  
were widely practiced by the UK and in the Netherlands up until the 1990s. There are, 
of course, a number of major differences between the UK and the Netherlands. The 
policies implemented in the UK and the Netherlands aimed to fully incorporate the 
minorities into society and encourage their participation while maintaining their  
distinguishing characteristics and allowing for the expression of the minority culture. 
This may require that state institutions adapt or set up parallel institutions for 
19 Please see Appendix 1 for a data comparison on multiculturalism in the member 
states. 
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immigrants in order to provide equally for all members of society. Multiculturalist 
policies stress that relationships with society should be developed, but not at the expense 
of the minority culture. 
Liberal and democratic values have influenced multiculturalist policies which 
emphasize the protection of civic and political rights such as the freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, ability to form groups and association, and to promote their views 
in civil society. This may include exemption from laws which affect religious practices, 
such as school or civil servant uniforms. The education curriculum may also be adapted 
to include alternative views and the use of minority languages may be supported by the 
state which may also fund minority associations. Multiculturalism is typically connected 
to the civic rather than ethnic citizenship regimes. The overall goals of multicultural  
policies are to promote the participation and absorption of immigrants in society and 
prevent assimilation while at the same time respecting and recognizing the unique 
identity of these individuals and groups. The British model stands out as a different 
mode of integration in a multicultural society. The Dutch model encountered serious 
problems at the end of the 1990s resulting in a change in the Dutch policy of 
multiculturalism. In contrast, there are also EU members who treat multiculturalism 
completely differently by fostering and encouraging assimilation. 
1.2.2. Assimilation and Integration 
In contrast to multiculturalism, which values and respects diversity, assimilation 
policies aim to incorporate minorities into the mainstream society by encouraging (or 
forcing) them to shed their cultural, ethnic or religious particularities in favor of those of 
the dominant group. Full incorporation of minorities is key in order to avoid conflicts 
which arise when immigrants are designated as “the other”, or as being too dissimilar in 
relation to the majority group. States which follow assimilation policies tend to believe 
that the granting of rights to minority groups would hurt the nation-state, as is the case 
in France. 
Assimilation policies typically consist of requirements for learning the language 
of the majority (there may be a test to determine the immigrant's ability in that language 
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which may or may not affect his or her prospects for citizenship) and religious or 
cultural dress that does not conform to that of the majority may be prohibited. The 
rationale behind assimilation is that if immigrants become more like the majority, they  
will not suffer as much from discrimination or racism and are more likely to thrive and 
less likely to be marginalized. 
Integration, on the other hand, consists of the mixing of the majority and the 
minority. It values both protecting the culture as well as intergroup relations in society. 
Integration policies may include the desegregation of neighborhoods and housing 
projects as well as the promotion of mixed schools and social organizations. Integration 
can either be part of assimilation policies, in that it is implemented by the state in a way 
known as acculturation to encourage the homogenization of its population by requiring 
immigrants to conform to the way of life of the majority. It may also be viewed from a 
more multiculturalist lens, whereby immigrants are incorporated into political and civic  
institutions.
1.3. Concluding Remarks
This chapter analyzed multiculturalism in its general contours and began a 
preliminary analysis of multiculturalism in the EU by specifying the different 
approaches taken by the member states. It is important to remember that the definition 
of the term 'multiculturalism' is contested and when combined with the varying 
experiences and histories of the member states results in different interpretations and 
practices. The differing experiences of the member states with immigration and 
minorities, important components of multiculturalism, stems from the lack of an EU 
level policy. This is reflected in the member states' position on Turkish enlargement as 
will be explored below. The subsequent chapters will examine the British, French, and 
Dutch approaches in dealing with their diverse populations and the public perception of 
these issues. 
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Chapter 2: Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom
 
“Britain is by far - and I mean by far - the best place to live in Europe if you are not  
white.”20
This chapter investigates the British society from a lens of multiculturalism. The 
UK stands out from the other EU member states as a unique example of 
multiculturalism. The British system of multiculturalism is linked to the internal  
diversity of the UK and its colonial legacy. This chapter takes a close look at the British 
practice and aims to develop a framework of analysis linking the British vision of 
multiculturalism to the British position on enlargement and Turkish accession. The UK 
was also the one of three EU members - the others being Ireland and Sweden - which 
did not choose to implement the 2004 Commission recommendation to impose a seven 
year transition period on the freedom of mobility to the newcomers to the EU. The 
question that one could pose then is what makes the British more favorable to 
multiculturalism than the other EU members. 
2.1. The British System of Multiculturalism
The United Kingdom has been a multicultural state for centuries.21 As it consists 
20 Trevor Phillips, Head of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, “Why Britain 
Is Now the Least Racist Country in Europe,” Mail Online, 19 January  2009. Available 
online at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1121442/TREVOR-PHILLIPS-
Why-Britain-LEAST-racist-country-Europe.html. 
21 The Kingdom of England (including Wales) and the Kingdom of Scotland agreed to 
create the United Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707. In 1800 Ireland joined and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was formed. It would later (in 1927) 
become the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland following a 
dispute with Ireland. For more information see the UK National Archives: 
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of four different nations - England, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland – there is a 
strong tradition of multiple identities within the UK. As the UK is neither a unitary nor a 
federal state, its hybrid character has engendered a weak sense of statehood and a 
diverse political system (Loughlin, 2007). Loughlin characterizes it as, “a curious 
mixture of both centralization and administrative and cultural diversity.”22 The UK's 
experience with internal cultural diversity has impacted its outlook on minorities. The 
British policy of indirect rule of its colonies allowed the colonists to maintain their 
identity and culture. The combination of the British experience with its unique, internal 
history and the flow of migration to the UK from its former colonies provided the 
impetus for the formation of the British policy of multiculturalism.  
Migration to the UK has been underway for ages; immigration to the UK is in no 
way a new phenomenon. Britain aspired to manage its increasing cultural diversity 
through a system of promoting good race relations and multiculturalism. In order to do 
so, in the post-war period British nationality law was updated, immigration was 
controlled, and race relations legislation was implemented. 
At the end of World War II, migration from the Commonwealth picked up, 
necessitating a response from London. The British government employed a laissez-faire 
and decentralized version of multiculturalism which gave minorities full equal rights, 
putting them on equal footing with the majority. Their religious differences were also 
respected and the formation of migrant organizations was encouraged as was the 
participation of immigrants in politics. The British version of multiculturalism, as a 
result of the long tradition of the UK in dealing with different cultures, not only tolerates 
diversity but also values and respects it. Interaction between different communities is 
encouraged and immigrants' food, dress, and language needs are accommodated by the 
state.
This is not to say that the British experience with multiculturalism and diversity 
has been without problems. There were several instances of riots and violence against 
immigrants, not to mention the terrorist attack in July 2005. The UK has also imposed 
restrictions on various groups of immigrants, starting with restrictions on immigrants 
www.nationalarchives.gov.uk.
22 John Loughlin, “State, Linguistic and Cultural Diversity in Europe,” in United in  
Diversity: European Integration and Political Cultures, edited by Ekavi 
Athanassopoulou (London: I.B. Tauris and Company, Limited 2007) p. 197.
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from the former British colonies following World War II. The next section will explore 
the historical legacy from the Commonwealth and what it means for multiculturalism in 
the UK. 
 
2.1.1. The Historical Legacy of the Commonwealth
The British colonial experience is an important aspect in determining the basis of 
multiculturalism in today’s British society. Thus, a brief look into the historical legacy is  
in order. Britain began the process of gradually disengaging from its colonies at the end 
of World War II. India was partitioned into India and Pakistan in 1947. India remained 
under the crown until it declared independence in 1950. Pakistan proclaimed 
independence a few years later in 1956. Decolonization continued through the 1960s 
and 1970s with most of the African colonies as well as colonies in other locations being 
granted independence. The Empire finally came to an end in 1997 with the handover of 
Hong Kong to the Chinese. 
Most of the former British colonies plus the UK itself are members of the 
Commonwealth of Nations, an intergovernmental organization set up in 1949 with the 
signing of the London Declaration which called for the free and equal association of the 
member countries. Since then, the organization has grown and today the fifty-four 
members of the Commonwealth share the goals of democracy and development.23 In 
addition, the majority of the members speak the same language (English), have 
historical ties, and similar institutions due to the influence of the British 
Commonwealth. There are cultural similarities as well: the popularity of the games of 
cricket and rugby and the British fondness for Indian food. Former British Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook even proclaimed chicken tikka masala, an Indian meal, to be a 
“true British national dish.”24 While the British Empire is no longer intact, a strong 
relationship between the UK and its former colonies continues to exist. These 
connections are integral today in fostering an atmosphere of tolerance and respect for 
23 British Government, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/180380/.  Accessed July 11, 2010. 
24 Robin Cook, speech to the Social Market foundation, 19 April 2001, text available 
online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/apr/19/race.britishidentity.
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diversity. The fact that the British followed an indirect system of rule allowed the 
colonies to maintain their distinctiveness and has in turn resulted in the British 
government pursuing policies that are friendlier to immigrants.
The waves of immigration to the UK exemplify the strong connection between 
the former colonies and the UK. South Asians began migrating to the UK in the mid 
nineteenth century. After World War II, the immigrants who first migrated to the UK 
were those who had served for the Empire in the war, an experience that had solidified 
their ties to it (Brighton, 2007). Immigrants from the British West Indies arrived next 
and in great numbers, with approximately 50,000 migrants arriving in 1960.25 They were 
soon followed by the South Asians, of which more than 100,000 had arrived by 1961.26 
These migrants, at the urging of the Royal Commission on Population, had traveled to 
the UK to fill the post-war labor shortages.27 Their immigration was facilitated by the 
1948 British Nationality Act which made all Commonwealth subjects British citizens 
and granted them and their families the right to work and live in the UK. As these 
immigrants had already lived under British rule, they were familiar with British culture 
and traditions and contributed to the UK's economic strength. 
The British government continued to encourage immigration in order to become 
more competitive internationally. Many of the immigrants, particularly Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis, provided cheap labor in the mills after the war. The mills were a crucial 
location where whites and Asians, as well as West Indians, mixed, fostering the 
integration of the immigrants into British society (Amin, 2002). Following the oil 
shocks in the 1970s and the resultant economic downturn, the mills were closed as the 
UK could no longer compete with the cheaper developing countries. 
In attempt to find employment, the immigrants turned to the service sector. They 
began working in restaurants, small shops, and as taxi drivers. The closure of the mills is 
significant regarding the issue of integration: once there was no longer a common place 
for immigrants and natives to interact, both groups turned inward and resentment began 
25 National Archives, Moving Here – Migration History, Caribbean. Available online at: 
http://www.movinghere.org.uk/galleries/histories/caribbean/journeys/journeys.htm.
26 National Archives, Moving Here – Migration History, South Asia. Available online 
at: http://www.movinghere.org.uk/galleries/histories/asian/settling/settling.htm
27 National Archives, Postwar Immigration. Available online at: 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/brave_new_world/immigratio
n.htm.
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to brew as they competed with each other for jobs. As immigrants continued to arrive 
but were no longer needed as workers, the initial welcoming attitude towards them 
began to change. Due to their racial differences, these immigrants, unlike those from 
other parts of Europe, were more visible and also began to concentrate in certain areas. 
The issue of race relations began to emerge and London was pressed to react to this 
growing issue. The next section will explore the British government's response to this 
matter and the position of various governments on multiculturalism. 
2.1.2. The Positions of the British Government on Multiculturalism
2.1.2.1. World War II to 1980
In the period following World War II, the migration of people from other areas of 
the Commonwealth was encouraged and promoted by the British government in order to 
deal with the labor shortage during and after the war. Due to the fact that these 
immigrants had been brought up with British education and culture, and more 
importantly, that they were essential to the economic success of the UK, the British 
government made efforts to accommodate them and welcomed them with open doors. 
The 1948 British Nationality Act provided British citizenship and nationality for all  
Commonwealth subjects and granted them and their families the right to work and live 
in the UK. They also had full political rights. Thousands of subjects took advantage of 
this law and migrated to the UK in order to fill the labor shortage. The immigrants were 
viewed positively, as a way for the UK to increase its labor resources, something that 
was valued at that time. In addition, the colonial workers were happy to take the jobs the 
others were more reluctant to do. 
However, as more and more immigrants from the colonies settled in the UK, the 
number of jobs available for them declined. The steady stream of Indian and Pakistani 
immigrants presented another challenge as they were generally viewed as being inferior 
and less qualified when compared to the East Indians. Plus, they were also thought to 
have more difficulties integrating and adapting than the East Indians (Tendler, 2007). 
While their contributions to the British economy were valued, the immigrants were 
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faced with discrimination and exploitation and encountered poor living and working 
conditions. 
The breaking point came in 1958 when riots erupted in Notting Hill due to racial 
conflict, bringing immigration to the forefront (Tendler, 2007). The economic downturn, 
high unemployment rates among the immigrants, their increasing concentration in 
certain areas and cities, and the rising rate of immigration coupled with the riots 
compelled the British government to impose restrictions on immigration in 1962 with 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. This act limited immigration from the New 
Commonwealth for the first time, mainly due to the surge in anti-immigrant sentiment 
(Tendler, 2007). It should be noted that the goal of this policy was to limit, not to 
eliminate entirely, immigration. Students, skilled workers, and other visitors were still  
allowed entry into the UK, although workers were required to have government issued 
vouchers to enter. It was hoped that such policies would improve relations; however, 
racial tension continued. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the British government employed a laissez-faire 
and decentralized version of multiculturalism implemented through a series of acts 
related to race, nationality, and immigration. These acts attempted to integrate minorities  
into society by, in the face of rising racism and discrimination, giving them full equal 
rights which put them on equal footing with the majority. Home Secretary Roy Jenkins 
aptly summarized the British approach in a speech in 1966:
Integration should not be seen as a flattening process of uniformity, but cultural 
diversity coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. It 
recognized a limited cultural diversity while saying that everyone should have 
shared civic duties.28
Cultural diversity, equal opportunity, and mutual tolerance - not assimilation and 
homogenization - were the cruxes of British multiculturalism. It employed a political  
and civic, rather than cultural, version of integration, espousing universal civic duties. 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act was followed by several other acts which 
strove to improve the relationship between races and ethnic groups. The 1965 Race 
Relations Act aimed to prevent racial discrimination and set up the Race Relations 
Board to handle complaints. A few months before this weak and limited act was due to 
28 Quoted in Dominic Casciani, “And This Is How You Vote”, BBC News, October 13 
2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4332380.stm.
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be replaced by the 1968 Race Relations Act, Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch 
Powell made his infamous “Rivers of Blood” speech in which he criticized the 
immigration policies of the UK and portrayed immigrants as invaders who would never 
be able to assimilate and would push white working class families out of their 
neighborhoods. His comments demonstrate the tendency in Britain to connect race and 
ethnicity; not only were the immigrants different, but they also threatened the status and 
lifestyle of the whites. Powell denounced the proposed Race Relations Act for allowing 
immigrants to maintain their cultural distinctiveness, rather than requiring their  
integration. In the most well-known line of his speech he remarked, “as I look ahead, I 
am filled with foreboding; like the Romans, I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with 
much blood.'”29 The speech was condemned by various newspapers as well as by 
Powell's fellow Conservatives. However, it also received a good deal of support and 
verbalized what many were feeling at the time. 
In the end, Powell was removed from Parliament and the Race Relations Act of 
1968 was signed. This act expanded the Race Relations Board and created the new 
Community Relations Committee in order to educate the public in an attempt to prevent  
discrimination and prejudice. The Community Relations Committee was also charged 
with promoting “harmonious community relations,”30 which is a typical component of 
multiculturalism. Plus, it extended the scope of the previous act and made it illegal to 
refuse housing, employment or public services to people based on color, race, ethnic or 
national origin. This demonstrated that rather than trying to homogenize the increasingly 
diverse society in the UK, the government instead preferred to provide for the equal 
treatment of its immigrant population.
Not only were the immigrants encouraged to integrate, but the state institutions 
were also required to accommodate the immigrants, showing that integration was a two-
way process. During this period, multiculturalism in the UK meant equal opportunity, 
cultural diversity, and mutual tolerance. It was, according to Adrian Favell, a system that 
consisted of, “on the one hand, ever-tightening immigration control; on the other, ever 
29 Enoch Powell, speech on April 20 1968. Full text available online at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643826/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-
speech.html.
30 British Government, Race Relations Act 1968, Part III (3)(a). Available online at: 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/.
24
more inclusive integration policies.”31 While problems related to race persisted, 
government policy demonstrated a predilection for supporting and recognizing ethnic 
and racial minorities in the post-war period. This exemplifies one strand of British 
multiculturalism: every culture has a right to exist and individuals and groups are 
connected territorially.32 
The provisions for the protection of minorities were strengthened in the 1976 
Race Relations Act which expanded the definition of discrimination to include indirect 
discrimination, allowed complaints to be taken to court, and replaced the Race Relations 
Board with the more powerful Commission for Racial Equality. The promotion of good 
race relations was emphasized in this act and local schools were given the resources and 
power to improve relations at the local level by encouraging anti-racist and multicultural  
initiatives. 
The 1971 Immigration Act confirmed the right of abode in the UK for British 
and Commonwealth citizens, known as “patrial”, and required those who are not patrial, 
e.g. those without connections or relatives in the UK, to have permission to enter. In 
addition, non-patrials were subject to the control and regulation of their entry; a quota 
on the number of non-patrials permitted to enter could be imposed. The rationale behind 
granting the right of abode to patrials was that by allowing Commonwealth citizens to 
establish the UK as their permanent home, the links to their home countries would 
diminish and they would integrate in British society. In addition to the requirement of 
sufficient knowledge of English which was introduced in 1948, an oath of allegiance 
upon naturalization became necessary. This demonstrated a change in the attitude of the 
government and a move toward of the second strand of British multiculturalism: 
diversity with coexistence united under Britishness.
2.1.2.2. 1980s to present 
The Thatcher government which came to power in 1979 promised to do more to 
31 Adrian Favell, Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship  
in France and Britain (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001) p. 106. 
32 “So What Exactly Is Multiculturalism?” BBC Online April 4, 2004. Available online 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3600791.stm.
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control immigration. Tensions had not subsided; they had even increased as was evident 
when riots broke out in 1981 in Toxteth, Brixton and Southall. While the motivation 
behind these riots was actually poverty, they were viewed as a challenge to the public 
order which required a response from the government (Favell, 2001). The Nationality 
Act of 1981 amended the 1948 act and reclassified citizens into three categories. It also 
ended the practice of jus soli citizenship for children born in Britain without British 
parents; at least one parent had to be either a British citizen or a permanent resident.  
This was a significant change that broke with a long tradition of jus soli. Many were 
opposed to this revision (Favell, 2001), but it reflected the growing concern with 
immigrants. 
In the 1980s, despite some episodes of violence, the reality of a multicultural 
Britain was more or less accepted throughout society. The 1985 Swann Report from the 
Committee of Enquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups 
described the UK as “both multiracial and culturally diverse” and called for the building 
of a “society which both values the diversity within it, whilst united by the cohesive 
force of the common aims, attributes and values which we all share,”33 which coincides 
with second strand of British multiculturalism which emphasizes unity under common 
values. 
The issue of common British values became even more salient after the 1989 
Rushdie Affair. Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses caused controversy in the 
Muslim world due to its blasphemous content. Protests erupted against the book, and a 
fatwa was issued calling for the death of Rushdie. The British Muslim community, 
which had before more or less remained on the sidelines of British society, was now 
front and center asserting themselves. British Muslims were not officially recognized in 
British legislation as an ethnic group, but had real religious and cultural differences 
from other groups. Due to their lack of recognition, they were disadvantaged and often 
congregated in the same neighborhoods. As a result, they had no way to express 
themselves in Britain's institutions. The outcry that broke out over the book illustrated 
their differences and in the words of Shane Brighton, “represented a pivotal moment in 
the political self-assertion of British Muslim communities and the end of the 
33 The Swann Report, “Education for All”, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the 
Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups (London: Her Majesty's Stationary 
Office, 1985).
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homogenizing and now politically irrelevant 'British Asian' identity that had persisted 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.”34 Some questioned the “Britishness” of British 
Muslims for not respecting Rushdie’s right to free speech (Brighton, 2007; Favell, 
2001). Many members of parliament, particularly those with Muslim constituencies, 
supported the Muslims while the government refused to condemn the burning of the 
book or of effigies of Rushdie. Politicians were mostly sympathetic to the cause in order 
to prevent further tension. This was in line with the logic of multiculturalism in that it  
respected the differences between different groups. 
However, the Rushdie Affair was a turning point for multiculturalism in the UK 
in that it made an issue of the identity and allegiance of the minorities. Conservative MP 
Norman Tebbit reflected this with his famous cricket test: "a large proportion of Britain's 
Asian population fail to pass the cricket test. Which side do they cheer for? It's an 
interesting test. Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?"35 
With this, foreign-born citizens and residents were, regardless of their citizenship or 
how many years they had spent in the UK, forced to choose sides. This indicates a shift 
in rhetoric towards assimilation or monoculturalism and ignores the fact that the UK had 
been a multicultural society for decades. Despite this, the UK was still regarded as a 
“genuinely multicultural society”36 in the 1980s.
While the end of the Cold War put the issues of race and immigration on the 
back burner for a few years, they were not forgotten. In 2000 Runnymede Trust 
published the findings of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, which 
was set up to examine the changing diversity of the British people. The report found that 
while the UK had strong laws which supported diversity, it was still faced with several 
problems: violence, discrimination, the lack of representation of minorities, and the 
racialization of ethnicity. The report suggested that in order to become a more cohesive 
society, common values which reflect and include all should be developed with the goal 
of sharing a common future (Parekh, 2001). While this report was not without criticism, 
it certainly reflected the sentiment at the time: that an overarching identity and set of  
34 Shane Brighton, “UK Foreign Policy: Integration and 'Cohesion' In and Beyond the 
State,” International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1, (2007): 7. 
35 Norman Tebbit quoted in John Carvel, “Tebbit's cricket loyalty test hit for six” The 
Guardian January 8, 2004. Available online at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/jan/08/britishidentity.race.
36 Favell,  Philosophies of Integration, p. 110. 
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values were needed to unite an increasingly divided Britain. Labour MP Robin Cook 
supported this idea while praising the diversity of British society:
 Today’s London is a perfect hub of the globe. It is home to over 30 ethnic 
communities of at least 10,000 residents each. In this city tonight, over 300 
languages will be spoken by families over their evening meal at home. This 
pluralism is not a burden we must reluctantly accept. It is an immense asset that 
contributes to the cultural and economic vitality of our nation...The modern 
notion of national identity cannot be based on race and ethnicity, but must be 
based on shared ideals and aspirations.37
The idea was cemented when riots broke out in Oldham, Bradford and Burnley 
in the spring and summer of 2001. Young second and third generation Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis who were disaffected, discriminated against, and hopeless demonstrated 
their rage in a series of riots. They were triggered in part by the rise of the right-wing 
British National Party (BNP), which was influenced by Enoch Powell's infamous 
speech. The BNP had been portraying Muslims as, “cultural aliens and pariahs, as 
recipients of preferential treatment, and as perpetrators of race attacks on innocent white 
people.”38 The media supported this claim by encouraging white people to think they 
were becoming the minorities. The Home Office's post-riot report in December 2001, 
Community Cohesion, drew attention to the de facto racial segregation that existed in 
many neighborhoods, schools, community organizations, places of worship, and 
workplaces, not to mention the different languages spoken throughout the country. 
These factors had contributed to the set up of parallel cities, where the minorities lived 
with little contact with other groups. This had led to even more discrimination and the 
spread of stereotypes and myths. 
British multiculturalism, while respecting diversity, does provide for some 
degree of civic assimilation. Minorities were accommodated (with halal food in schools 
and workplaces, the freedom to wear the hijab, prayer rooms in schools) and educated 
on mainstream values, but the majority was not being educated about minority cultures 
and traditions. The report urged the government to promote community cohesion while 
respecting diversity and also to establish a new brand of citizenship based on common 
principles. After the riots, Home Secretary David Blunkett stated that “one of this 
37 Robin Cook, Speech. 
38 Ash Amin, “Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diversity,” Report for 
the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions and the ESRC Cities 
Initiative, January 2002, p. 4.
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government's central aims is to achieve a society that celebrates its ethnic diversity and 
cultural richness; where there is respect for all, regardless of race, color, or creed.”39 The 
report combined with the statements of the Home Secretary display a slight shift in the 
British approach to multiculturalism: an inclusive approach was being implemented and 
civic integration and social cohesion were being promoted. 
The Community Cohesion report was followed by the February 2002 White 
Paper, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain. This 
report echoed the need for an inclusive society with a strong sense of community 
belonging and understanding of the shared civic values which accompany British 
citizenship. It recommended language lessons and citizenship education for applicants 
in order to help new citizens participate and engage in society, which in turn would 
promote integration. These suggestions were codified in the 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act which required applicants for citizenship to have 
“sufficient knowledge” about life in the UK, demonstrated through the 'Life in the UK' 
test which simultaneously tests knowledge of the UK and everyday life as well as in 
English (or Welsh or Scottish Gaelic). In addition, the language requirement was 
extended to the spouses of British citizens applying for naturalization. The early 2000s 
represent a move away from multiculturalism and diversity and toward a civic state with 
specific values. 
After the 2001 riots, the criticism of multiculturalism began to materialize (Meer 
and Modood, 2008). In the aftermath of the July 2005 London attacks, multiculturalism 
was effectively declared dead for having kept communities apart rather than bringing 
them together. 40 The Commission on Integration and Cohesion, set up by the Home 
Office after the attacks, suggested that more cohesion and integration were necessary. 
However, while many argued that the London bombers were not well-integrated into 
British society, evidence showed otherwise but was ignored by the press (Brighton, 
2007).  A few weeks after the attacks, Shadow Home Secretary David Davis criticized 
the multicultural policies for allowing the “perverted values of suicide bombers”41 to 
39 Quoted in Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, “The Multicultural State We're In: 
Muslims, 'Multiculture' and the 'Civic Re-Balancing' Of British Multiculturalism,” paper 
presented at Political Studies Conference, Swansea, April 1-3, 2008, p. 13. 
40 See, for example, Asaf Hussain et al. 2005, Modood  2008, Meer and Modood 2008.
41 David Davis, “Why Cultural Tolerance Cuts Both Ways”, The Daily Telegraph, 
August 3, 2005. 
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proliferate. He chided the Labour Party for allowing people from different cultures to 
settle in the UK without being expected to integrate. According to Davis, encouraging 
diversity had taken priority over promoting integration and as a result immigrants were 
turning toward extremism. 
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair seemed to concur that integration deserved a 
more prominent role in a speech on the future of the UK in December 2006. Blair 
reaffirmed a multicultural Britain and stressed that the common values that define it will  
continued to be celebrated: democracy, rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all,  
and respect for the UK and its heritage. He distinguishes between different types of 
integration, emphasizing that in the UK integration is related to values, rather than 
culture and lifestyle. Blair summed up the UK's current approach to multiculturalism, 
“the right to be different, the duty to integrate.”42
Following the 7/7 attacks there was a clear shift in policy. While 
multiculturalism had proved to be effective in the 1960s and 1970s, several issues had 
called its effectiveness into question: the riots, the Rushdie affair, September 11 th, and 
July 7th. Multiculturalist policies were blamed for leading to segregation and alienation. 
The government had encouraged diversity, but instead the result was division. This was, 
according to current sentiment, mainly due to the lack of unifying British values. Hence, 
over the past decade the British government has moved toward more civic integration 
policies while backing away from promoting diversity and immigration as it had done in 
the past. 
Today, immigrants are still arriving in the UK. But their composition is much 
different than it was in the past. The UK did not put restrictions on the freedom of 
movement for the states that acceded to the EU in 2004. The government had estimated 
that approximately 15,000 central and eastern European citizens would migrate to the 
UK in search of a job. However, the UK was quickly faced with a flood of immigrants 
from the new member states: 683,000 immigrants from the 2004 member states 
registered to work in the UK between May 2004 and July 2007, with approximately 70 
per cent coming from Poland. As an obvious result, the UK government decided to 
impose restrictions on the freedom of movement of Romanians and Bulgarians when 
42 Tony Blair, speech, December 8, 2006. Full text available online at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/migrationtemp/1536354/Full-text-of-Blair%2527s-
multiculturalism-speech.html. 
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they joined in 2007 (Bale, 2008). The high-scale migration of workers from the new 
member states became an issue, but it has since subsided with many of them returning 
home. The more recent immigration, as well as the previous waves of immigration from 
the former colonies, has divided the British people. The next section will examine the 
public's perceptions of multiculturalism. 
2.1.3. The Perception of the British Public on Multiculturalism43
The perception of the British public on multiculturalism is important in that  
affects the legislation that is passed in parliament. This is significant since 
multiculturalism is a member state level, not EU level, competency. The population of  
the UK is approximately 62 million and the net migration in the UK has been steadily 
increasing since the mid-1980s. The percentage of the UK's population which is foreign-
born ranges from 8 to 10 per cent (Bale, 2008; Citrin and Sides, 2009). While this 
number is not as high as some other Western European countries, it still constitutes a 
significant portion of the British population. Therefore, it is expected that many British 
people will have strong opinions regarding immigration, race, and multiculturalism. 
In Britain, people think there are many more immigrants in the UK than there 
actually are. According to data from the year 2007 presented by Citrin and Sides (2009), 
around 8 per cent of the population is foreign-born. Despite this, the British public 
perceives the amount of foreign-born people to be around 25 per cent, a number that is 
quite striking but not abnormal; other countries show similar results. This 
overestimation was likely influenced by the negative portrayal of immigrants in the 
media. 
Indeed, many are still concerned with immigration and the number has even 
increased slightly from 23 per cent to 25 per cent in 2009. This number is almost three 
times the EU average of 9 per cent44, demonstrating that immigration is much more of 
an issue in the UK than in other member states, despite years of multicultural policies. 
Immigration is also listed as the number one concern of the UK for 41 per cent of 
43  Please see Appendix 1 for a data comparison on multiculturalism in the member 
states.
44 Eurobarometer 71, Spring 2009.
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respondents, compared to the 16 per cent EU average.45 
Figure 1: The Two Most Important Issues Facing Our Country
Perhaps due to the high level of concern with immigration, fewer British people (than 
Dutch or French) agree that that people from other ethnic groups enrich their cultural 
life. 
Figure 2: People From Other Ethnic Groups Enrich Cultural Life
Furthermore, the British are more likely to agree that the presence of people from other 
ethnic groups increases unemployment in the UK, showing that it is common in the UK 
to connect immigration with economic issues.
45 Ibid.
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Figure 3: The Presence of Other Ethnic Groups Increases Unemployment
While many people think immigration is a major concern of the EU, most are 
still supportive of multiculturalism with almost two-thirds agreeing that 
multiculturalism makes Britain a better place to live. At the same time, the majority of  
those surveyed (58 per cent) think that people who move to Britain should adopt the 
values and traditions of British culture. Most people also disagree that the policy of 
multiculturalism in the UK has been a mistake and should be abandoned.46
With regard to values and issues related to civic integration, the vast majority of 
respondents agree that immigrants should learn English (82 per cent), accept the 
authority of British institutions (93 per cent), and accept the rights of women as equal 
citizens (96 per cent). Survey results show that while most surveyed support integration, 
they also believe that Muslims should have the right to wear headscarves at school (58 
per cent) and work (63 per cent). However, 69 per cent agree that Britain's national 
identity is essentially Christian.47 
In sum, while British people overestimate the number of foreign-born people 
living in the UK, they are generally supportive of multiculturalism. They support the 
46 BBC Poll, August 10, 2005.
47 Ibid.
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rights of ethnic minorities, but also would like that they display some characteristics of 
civic nationality. They are divided on whether integration or tolerance should be 
encouraged. The next section will discuss the impact of the British experience with 
multiculturalism on its stance on Turkish membership in the EU. 
2.2. The Link Between British Multiculturalism and British Support For Turkey's 
Accession
2.2.1. British Government Support 
The British government supports the accession of Turkey to the EU. The British 
support for Turkish membership in the EU is related to the British experience with 
immigration and diversity. A diverse country itself, Britain values diversity both 
internally and within the EU. The British Empire's tradition of indirect colonial rule led 
to a positive relationship between Britain and the colonial immigrants who were given 
full equal rights. Britain has implemented a wide range of policies to fight racism and 
discrimination. As such, civic integration is valued in the UK, cultural assimilation is 
not. Despite some episodes of racism and xenophobia, the prevailing view in Britain has 
been that immigrants and diversity enrich life. This view has taken hold in the UK due 
to the lack of an EU level policy on multiculturalism and related issues. As a result, 
Britain was able to pursue a policy that valued diversity. That the UK was the one of 
three EU members which did not implement the 2004 Commission recommendation to 
impose a seven year transition period on the freedom of mobility to the new member 
states demonstrates the openness of the EU to newcomers. The British government 
strongly believes that Turkish membership in the EU will contribute to diversity in the 
Union, helping it to live up to its motto of “unity in diversity”. 
The British experience with multiculturalism is reflected on the British position 
on Turkey. The UK is formerly an advocate for Turkey joining the EU and many 
prominent politicians also endorse Turkish membership. The relatively positive 
experience with multiculturalism in the UK could be one factor which influenced the 
British endorsement of Turkish membership. Current Prime Minister David Cameron 
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firmly supports Turkish membership. In a recent speech in Ankara, he stated that he 
wants, “to pave the road from Ankara to Brussels,”48 and expressed his desire to “fight” 
for Turkish membership in the EU. Queen Elizabeth is a proponent of membership as 
well, noting that, “Turkey is uniquely positioned as a bridge between East and West at a 
crucial time for the European Union and the world in general.”49 Former Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband concurs with the Prime 
Minister and the Queen, declaring that, “if we want to show that being European is 
about values not race or religion, having a Muslim country with a secular public realm 
within the EU can only strengthen us.”50 While all three would like to see Turkey join 
the EU, Miliband's statement is the one most clearly influenced by multiculturalism. 
Other countries may attach specific religious or racial characteristics to the EU, but the 
position of the British government is that being European is about values. To them, 
diversity is a strength, rather than a weakness.  
The British government also feels a sense of comradeship with Turkey, 
influenced by its own history as an accession state in 1973. Prime Minister Cameron, 
while in Ankara, recalled comments made by Charles de Gaulle about the British EU 
accession, right before de Gaulle vetoed it: 
Here is a country which is not European...its history, its geography, its economy, 
its agriculture and the character of its people – admirable people though they are 
– all point in a different direction…This is a country which…cannot, despite 
what it claims and perhaps even believes, be a full member.51 
Cameron aptly compared de Gaulle's remarks on the UK from several decades ago to 
the current criticism of Turkey, adding that, “we know what it’s like to be shut out of the 
club. But we also know that these things can change.”52 The experience of the British 
accession is much like the situation that Turkey is faced with today with questions 
regarding its Europeanness and differences. It can be said that because of this, and due 
48 Ibid.
49 “Britain's Queen Elizabeth's Visit To Turkey Continues,” Hurriyet Daily News, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/turkey/8927125.asp.
50 David Miliband, “Strong Britain in a Strong Europe,” International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London. Text available online at: http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-
addresses/david-miliband-address-oct-09/.
51 David Cameron, speech in Ankara, 27 July 2010. Available online at 
http://www.politicshome.com/uk/article/12739/full_text_david_cameron_endorses_tu
rkish_membership_of_the_eu.html.
52 Ibid.
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to the unique British experience with its diverse and multicultural population which 
stems from the lack of a supranational policy requiring harmonization in this area, the 
British government strongly supports Turkish membership. 
2.2.2. British Public Uncertainty53
While the government has steadily supported Turkish accession, the public is not 
as certain about Turkey. Different polls show different levels of support for enlargement 
and Turkish accession; in general, the public seems to be split over the Turkish question 
with over 40 per cent agreeing that Turkish membership is neither good nor bad. 
Figure 4: British Opinion on Turkey's Membership in the EU
53  Please see Appendix 2 for a data comparison on the opinion of enlargement in the 
member states.
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Figure 5: Turkey's Membership in the EU
This is due to the high level of concern with the economic situation and unemployment 
as well as with immigration (Eurobarometer 71). However, the Pew Global Attitudes 
Survey (2005) shows that the British are less concerned with immigration than other 
Western European countries, including France and the Netherlands. This may be due to 
the system of multiculturalism in Britain which treats immigrants as full citizens, rather  
than guests or people to be assimilated. British people are to a certain extent worried 
about immigration, but a majority believe that multiculturalism makes the UK a better  
place to live,54 that diversity enriches cultural life,55 and that enlargement would ensure 
that immigrants are better integrated.56 
54 BBC Poll, August 10, 2005.
55 Eurobarometer 71, Spring 2009.
56 Special Eurobarometer 255, July 2006.
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Figure 6: Enlargement Ensures Better Integration
The British are almost evenly split over whether Turkey has enough common values to 
be considered part of the West or whether Turkey is too different. 
Figure 7: British Opinion on Turkish Values
In addition, while public opinion over Turkey appears divided, there is no doubt that an 
overwhelming majority support diversity and tolerance. This is likely a legacy of the 
British experience with multiculturalism. 
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Chapter 3: French Monoculturalism 
“If living in France bothers some people, they should feel free to leave a country they  
don't like. We've had more than enough of always having the feeling that we must  
apologize for being French.”57
This chapter examines the French position and attitudes towards 
multiculturalism. A key point addressed in this chapter is that there is a general 
inclination in France towards monocultural, rather than multicultural, policies. A 
particular reason behind this stance might be the legacy of the French imperial system of 
direct rule in the colonies and its mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission) which have 
shaped both modern French policy toward immigrants as well as toward enlargement. 
The absence of an EU level policy related to multiculturalism and immigration has 
allowed France to pursue such policies. France is unique in that it has, since the colonial 
era, sought to assimilate the population in its colonies and on the mainland through the 
spread of the French language and republican ideals. The French experience with its 
immigrant population is surveyed in this chapter, linking French monoculturalism to the 
French position on EU enlargement. Particularly significant is the French “no” vote on 
the proposed constitution for the EU which is also regarded by French elites as a no vote 
on further enlargement.58 
57 Nicolas Sarkozy, April 27, 2007. 
58 However, post-referendum surveys, such as Flash Eurobarometer June 2005, show 
that the most popular reason for voting against the European Constitution was that it 
was perceived to have negative effects on the employment situation in France 
whereas the seventh most popular choice (6 per cent) for voting against the 
Constitution was opposition to Turkish membership in the EU.
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3.1. The French Unitary State System: A Historical Legacy From the Revolution
It is possible to argue that the French unitary state, a legacy from the French 
Revolution, has impacted how France approaches its multicultural population. In the 
French system, the nation and the state coincide and citizenship takes priority over 
ethnicity, race, and religion. The inhabitants of France are united not by their shared 
ethnicity or religion, but by their shared language and values. The republican values 
which grew out of the revolution (secularism, equality, legal freedom, fraternity, 
patriotism) still represent the essence of France today. 
The French proclivity for political and social unity is complicated by the 
existence of a diverse population on its territory. While data on race and ethnicity is not 
collected by the French government in order to prevent discrimination, it is estimated 
that approximately 18 per cent of the French population is either foreign, French by 
naturalization, or foreign born.59 The French state has struggled to reconcile the nation-
state with its large immigrant population. 
However, the heterogeneity of France is nothing new; before the 1789 
Revolution, France was made up of different provinces with their own cultures, dialects, 
and parliaments. The only unifying feature at that time was French, the common 
language (Wihtol de Wenden, 2003). France transitioned from a pluralist community to 
a unified nation during the French Revolution.60 The Declaration of the Rights of Man  
and Citizen (1789) defined the universal and fundamental rights of French citizens.61 
The Declaration espoused the Jacobin republican values, emphasizing unity over 
diversity. The sovereign nation declared by the National Assembly during the revolution 
interpreted membership in the nation-state as being based on citizenship rather than 
ethnicity. From this point on, belonging to France was a political, not ethnic, concept. 
Later the principle of laïcité (secularism) was also recognized as a core concept in 
59 Kimberly Hamilton, “The Challenge of French Diversity,” Migration Policy Institute, 
November 2004. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=266.
60 The French Revolution (1789-1799) resulted in the creation of the First Republic in 
September 1792. The rule of the monarchy in France came to an end in 1871 with the 
Third Republic. The French constitution stipulates that the executive is stronger than 
the parliament. In addition, the central government is supreme over the regional 
governments which allows for unity in legislation throughout the country. 
61 The rights were originally only granted to men; they were later extended to women. 
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France. The principles developed during the revolution play a major role in the policies 
of the French state toward its minority population and are frequently used to justify the 
assimilatory policies that have been implemented. France, along with the other member 
states, is free to follow its own method of dealing with its minority population as there is 
no supranational regime in this area. 
3.1.1. The Promotion of Multicultural Homogeneity Through Assimilation
The unitary republican tradition dictates that ethnicity, race, and religion are not  
to be recognized by the state.62 Separating the French nation into different groups is 
considered unfair and as promoting inequality. Moreover, there is no need to distinguish 
between groups as all who reside in France are, or will become, French. Both 
immigrants and French natives are treated equally; there is no special treatment or 
positive discrimination for either party. By creating a unified and indivisible French 
nation based on Jacobin ideals, it was hoped that France would not be subject to internal 
divisions and that its national identity would be maintained (Jennings, 2000).
In order to perpetuate a sense of social unity and common nationhood, France 
has employed a set of policies in which there is “no space for the concept of a minority.”
63 As such, no financial support is provided to ethnic, racial, or religious minority 
groups. In addition, their rights to organize remained restricted until 1981. Instead of 
promoting and encouraging diversity as the British and Dutch did, the French 
government sought to turn all the inhabitants of France into French citizens thereby 
creating a common unifying identity that would muffle, if not hide or erase, all other 
levels of identity. This policy of assimilation and absorption aims to fully incorporate 
minorities into French society hoping that putting aside cultural or traditional practices 
will result in less conflict (Inglis, 1996). In the words of Brubaker:
whether juridical (as in naturalization) or cultural, assimilation presupposes a 
political conception of membership and the belief, which France took over from 
the Roman tradition, that the state can turn strangers into citizens, peasants – or 
62 French Government, Article 1, French Constitution. Text available online at: 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp.
63 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political  
Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) p. 6.
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immigrant workers – into Frenchmen.64 
The French philosophy of integration is one of assimilation in that French principles 
must be adhered to. Integration must follow the secular principle which respects 
religious beliefs but does not support them. The formation of groups is discouraged as 
the individual is valued over potentially destabilizing groups. French law must be 
respected, as must French culture and traditions. 
It is important to recognize that 'integration' and 'assimilation' are often used 
either interchangeably or mistakenly both by the media and the government (Jennings, 
2000). If integration is taken to mean the mixing of the majority and the minority while 
protecting both culture and intergroup relations and assimilation implies the 
homogenization and loss of cultural, ethnic, national or religious identity, it can be said 
that the French system employs a combination of integration and assimilation but leans 
more toward assimilatory policies. While France has taken some steps toward protecting 
culture (although this has recently regressed as will be discussed below) which can be 
deemed as integrationist, the bulk of French policies are aimed at erasing the cultural,  
national, and religious identities of people residing in France in order to mold them into 
French citizens. 
The French method of dealing with a diverse population supposes that individual 
minorities can and are willing to give up their identity in favor of becoming “French”. 
One's background becomes irrelevant as he or she becomes French: “when you are not 
born French, you have to adhere to a set of values to become French...you have to erase 
your past, which is integral in French assimilation.”65 Therefore, the Anglo-Saxon 
practice of multiculturalism is viewed as un-French in that it promotes unequal rights, 
cultural differentialism, closed communities and groups over individuals (Jennings, 
2000). This constitutes a key difference between France and the UK and the Netherlands 
in terms of their views of multiculturalism and how they deal with the challenges posed 
by the existence of multiple ethnic groups in one’s own country. 
64 William Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France 
and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis,” International Sociology Vol. 5, No. 
4, (Dec 1990): 390.
65 Tony S. Juge and Michael P. Perez, “The Modern Colonial Politics of Citizenship and 
Whiteness in France,” Social Identities Vol 12, No 2, (March 2006): 202.
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3.1.1.1. Assimilation in the imperial period 
In order to assess the French tradition of assimilation, it is necessary to start from 
the imperial period of nineteenth century post revolutionary France. In contrast to the 
British philosophy of indirect rule, the French practiced a more direct style of 
administration which aimed to civilize the less-developed regions in its empire by 
spreading the French language and culture. Especially important in that respect was the 
1848 Revolution which granted French citizenship to former slaves in the Caribbean and 
parts of Senegal. Algeria became an integral part of France in the mid 1830s and the 
French administrative structure was imposed. In the 1880s, several important policies 
were enacted which are still in effect today. Schools became responsible for teaching 
moral and civic values and thus were transformed into a place where socialization into 
French values takes place. 
In addition, a 1889 law gave French citizenship to all people born in France to 
foreign-born parents, beginning the practice of jus soli. The parliament was confident 
that they would assimilate and wanted to make use of the new citizens in the conscripted 
army. The view at the time was that that, “if schools and the army could turn peasants 
into Frenchman, they could turn native-born foreigners into Frenchman the same way.”66 
In the colonial period, the state aspired to integrate those living or working in France by 
granting them citizenship and thus requiring their participation in the institutions which 
propagated republican ideals: state schools and the military. 
The nineteenth century practice of creating Frenchmen from foreigners gave way 
to new practices with the new wave of immigration. Immigration en masse began after 
World War I when more than 100,000 Algerians arrived in France. Their immigration 
was facilitated by Algeria's special agreement with France. In general, immigration from 
North Africa was not controlled at this time. Many Africans started to work in France 
which fueled the fear in certain segments of French society that the Africans were taking 
all the jobs. In order to prevent a conflict, restrictions on African immigrants began in 
1924. During the Depression, North Africans experienced high levels of unemployment 
and restrictions on further immigration from Africa were implemented. As most of the 
66 Brubaker, “Immigration”, p. 396. 
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immigrants had grown up with French culture, had been educated in French schools, 
and were French speakers, their absorption into French society had not presented a 
major problem at this time. While the policies of assimilation may not have been as 
extensive as is typically reported (Favell, 2001), they still set the precedent for post-
colonial immigration policies. The French policy towards immigration and 
multiculturalism began to take shape at this time, determining the post-1945 laws and 
regulations. 
3.1.1.2. Assimilation in the post-colonial period
 
Immigration picked up during World War II when both workers and soldiers 
were needed for French national interests. Hundreds of thousands of North Africans, 
particularly those from Algeria, left Africa for France to fill the demand for labor. In 
order to deal with the influx of immigrants, the centralized Social Action Fund (SAF) 
was created in the 1950s with the goal of helping Algerians integrate into French 
culture. In the post-colonial period its mandate was extended to all foreign workers and 
assistance (language, way of life in France) in adapting to life in France was provided to 
them. The signing of bilateral agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in the 
early 1960s increased the inflow of Maghrebi workers to France. The position towards 
migration began to change with the economic problems of the 1970s. Due to worsening 
economic conditions and rising unemployment in the early 1970s, France introduced 
annual restrictions on the number of workers in 1971. 
As the economic downturn continued, the focus shifted away from absorbing the 
immigrants to making them ideal French citizens. The minorities, many of whom were 
Muslim, wanted legal recognition of their right to be different. However, the policy was 
that the recognition of differences led to racism. Equal treatment and the lack of specific 
rights for groups were thought to ensure that they would not be discriminated against. 
Despite this, the government did to a certain extent support religious pluralism in the 
1970s. The practice of Islam was tolerated in the factories where many Muslims 
worked, financial support was provided for religious books, and the salaries of imams 
were paid by the state (mainly in attempt to thwart influence from Muslim countries). 
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Cultural pluralism was supported as well, with classes provided in mother-tongue 
languages for children and various cultural television programs designed to appeal to 
immigrants were broadcast (Bleich, 2005). These practices, reminiscent of the British 
stance on multiculturalism, directly contradict the French policy of assimilation and 
show that the government has not been consistent in its policies. 
More steps in the direction of pluralist policies were made under the Mitterrand 
Socialist government which came to power in 1981. For the first time, organizations 
based on nationality or ethnicity were permitted and more intercultural projects were 
undertaken. The SAF was reformed as well; it became more independent and immigrant 
representatives were included on the board. In addition, Regional Commissions for the 
Insertion of Immigrant Populations (CRIPI) were created, devolving authority from the 
state level. Mitterrand also introduced the Ministry of Culture during his tenure in the 
1980s which operated under the banner of droit a la difference (the right to difference). 
(Favell, 2000).
Following the movement made toward a more pluralist approach in the early 
1980s, the economic and unemployment problems of the late 1980s again drew attention 
to the issue of immigrants and immigration. According to Favell, in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the “debate about immigration and integration...was arguably the most 
visible and salient issue in French politics.”67 The rise of right-wing parties at the time 
needs particular mention, partly stimulated by the change in the electoral law. With the 
introduction of proportional representation in parliamentary elections in 1986, Jean-
Marie Le Pen's Front National (FN) party gained thirty-five seats in the National 
Assembly. FN had taken up the issues of immigration and integration, supporting the 
idea of a homogenous France and opposing immigration, particularly from Muslim 
countries. Le Pen highlighted the differences between the Muslims and the native 
French, emphasizing that the differences of the Muslims made them “not one of us”. 
The relatively high level of support for FN in this election can be explained as the 
ramification of the past policies towards immigrants which were no longer viewed as 
being effective. Immigrants became scapegoats and were cast by FN as taking 
advantage of France's substantial social welfare system while not contributing to society 
or making an effort to integrate; they were the cause of all the ills in French society. 
67 Favell, Philosophies, p. 40.
46
Their loyalty to the French republic was called into question by Le Pen who suggested 
that citizenship was connected to, “loyalty to French territory, culture, and history, 
and...strong cultural assimilation as a condition of political incorporation.”68 With this, 
the concept of citizenship was connected to that of integration, setting the stage for 
further conflicts in this area. This is particularly important because the French position 
towards multiculturalism became markedly different from the British and Dutch 
positions.  
1989 was a turning point in the French position toward multiculturalism. The 
1989 affaire du foulard (headscarf affair) was a major breaking point in relations 
between Muslim immigrants and the French public. Three girls (2 Moroccan, 1 
Tunisian), accused by the headmaster of their school of not complying with the French 
principle of laïcité (secularism), were expelled for wearing headscarves. Surprisingly, 
the Conseil d'Etat said the headmaster, not the students, had broken the law of freedom 
of religious beliefs (Hargreaves, 2000). The Conseil stated that they could wear their 
headscarves just as Christians could wear crucifixes and Jews could wear yarmulkes. At 
this time, it was illegal to proselytize in state schools but religious symbols were not 
considered proselytism. 
While the state response to the affaire was in favor of the Muslims, the public 
response was not as friendly. With the memory of the Iranian Revolution still fresh, the 
fear of Islamic fundamentalism took off. Not only was the headscarf considered a 
challenge to the secular school system, but it also, according to its detractors, displayed 
the patriarchal character of Islam. Neither of these were deemed as being compatible 
with French republican values. However, not all French people were against the 
headscarf. Many supported the right to wear the headscarf in state schools with the view 
that people should be able to express their identity without having to assimilate to the 
mainstream culture. Thus a conflict manifested, between those on the multicultural left  
who thought that immigrants should not be assimilated, and those on the right who 
thought that immigrants could not be assimilated. 
The policies put in place after the headscarf affair tended to fall in the middle of 
these two positions. The prevailing view since the 1990s has been that immigrants 
should at least be integrated, if not assimilated. Policies have slowly been enacted in 
68 Ibid., p. 54.
47
order to facilitate, and at times force, their integration. Under Chirac, the contrats  
d'accueil et d'integration policy began in 2003 which required one day of civics 
instruction and 500 hours of French lessons (if necessary) for newcomers. The policy 
strove to better integrate newcomers into French society. Likewise, the Sarkozy Law of 
November 2003 restricted access to permanent residence and tied republican integration 
(knowledge of the French language and the principles that define the French republic) to 
residency. 
However, more assimilatory policies have also been enacted, such as the 2004 
ban on religious symbols in schools. This applied to all “ostensibly” religious symbols, 
but the main target was clearly the headscarf. In banning the headscarf, the National 
Assembly hoped to encourage Muslims to assimilate and become more secular. 
Immigrants who are not integrated into French society and do not profess a belief in 
French values inspire a deep rooted fear of internal division and of loss of national 
identity. Six years later the same fears still exist and motivated the National Assembly to 
pass another bill, this time banning the full face veil (niqab or burqa). Again, the 
motivation for passing this bill was to help Muslim women integrate into society and to 
prevent them from being forced to dress a certain way, but critics have pointed out that 
this ban violates the basic republican principles. 
Overall, the French state has been more hostile than friendly to ethnic, national, 
and religious diversity. The republican values and system of laïcité were designed to 
guarantee a neutral state. Whether or not the state actually is neutral in practice is  
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as will be discussed in the next section, while 
the French government has at times displayed a cordial attitude towards immigrants, it  
has been overshadowed by the strict assimilationist nature of many of the policies. 
3.1.2. The French Government's Positions on Multiculturalism
As discussed above, the French government has a long tradition of supporting 
assimilation in France and its former territories. Despite the multicultural character of  
France, neither liberals nor conservatives refer to it as 'multicultural' (Parekh, 2002). 
There is a certain stigma attached to the word; moreover, multicultural policies are 
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viewed by many in France as having contributed to the riots and terror attacks in the UK 
and the assassinations in the Netherlands. In contrast, the French policy of assimilation, 
despite its problems, has more or less accomplished the goal of protecting the French 
nation and territory. 
These policies aim to fully integrate immigrants into French society, turning 
them into good French citizens. The French concept of assimilation is related to the 
republican principle of equality where minority groups are not recognized, as their 
recognition would breed inequality. This is in stark contrast to the UK and the 
Netherlands, both of which pursue markedly different policies which support their 
minority populations. The French interpretation of equality precludes multiculturalism 
from being practiced in France as it would necessitate the recognition of different 
cultural, ethnic, and religious groups. The French system of state-centric direct 
assimilation therefore strives for linguistic and political unity with the aim of achieving 
cultural unity through the state aided assimilation of those who are not culturally French 
(Brubaker, 1990). Belonging to France is political and is connected to the secular 
institutions which socialize all into French culture and thought. The government has in 
recent years repeatedly dealt with the issue of the incorporation and assimilation of 
newcomers into France. 
The open door immigration policies of the 1960s became more restrictive in the 
1970s as a result of the economic downturn. The continued economic troubles in the 
1980s fueled the anti-immigration stance of Le Pen's FN. Plus, integration had become 
more difficult due to the weakening of ties between France and its former colonies, high 
levels of unemployment among the immigrant population, housing segregation which 
prevented the interaction of immigrants with the French, and the decline in the 
effectiveness of the army and state schools in integrating newcomers (Jennings, 2000). 
As a result, when the Mitterrand government came into power there began to be talk of 
reforming the nationality code and of better ways to integrate the North African and 
Arab Muslims. The 1989 headscarf affair brought the issue of the perceived failure to 
integrate to the forefront and the government started to look into different ways of 
solving this mounting problem. 
In 1988, the Rapport de la Commission de la nationalite (Report of the 
Commission on Nationality) reaffirmed that strong institutions which embody French 
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universal values were critical for integrating newcomers and called for, “the full 
integration of immigrants and the affirmation of a strong French identity.”69 In order to 
make integration easier, the Haut Conseil a l'integration (High Council on Integration) 
was created in 1990 by Mitterrand’s Prime Minister, Michel Rocard. The council was 
charged with advising the government on how to better integrate immigrants into French 
society. Despite the efforts of the Mitterrand administration to find a more pluralist 
solution to the problems that had come to head following the headscarf affair in 1989, 
the mood in the 1990s tended to favor more assimilatory policies. The prevailing 
attitude of the 1990s is exemplified in this quote by Jacques Chirac in 1991, who was 
the mayor of Paris at the time:
What is the most urgent: to save the identity of French people or to accept all 
those, using political arguments, who would like to come and get on welfare, and 
to use our hospitals and our universities?...Our problem is not the foreigners, it is 
more the overdose of foreigners. Maybe it is true that the foreigners are more 
numerous than before the war, but they are different, and it makes a difference. 
It is certain that having Spanish, Polish, and Portuguese working on our soil, 
create fewer problems than having Muslims and blacks. How do you except a 
French worker and his wife, both working, and making 2150 dollars a month, 
and who see his next door neighbor, a family composed of a father, his three or 
four wives, and about twenty of his kids, making 7150 dollars from welfare, 
without of course, working...and if you add the noise and the smell; well this 
French worker becomes crazy. And it is not racist to say that.70 
Here, all the common prejudices of immigrants can be seen: they abuse and take 
advantage of the welfare system, there are too different culturally (particularly the 
Muslims and blacks, who are, according to Chirac, polygamous), and they are lazy, loud 
and foul-smelling. The most striking part of this statement is that Chirac qualifies these 
beliefs as not being racist. The fact that a politician, who had already served as prime 
minister for two years in the 1970s and would return to the position in 1986 and then 
become a two-term president of France, could make such a statement with demonstrates 
the second class position of immigrants in France. While it is not unexpected for 
politicians like Le Pen (who promised the expulsion of immigrants if he won the 2002 
presidential election and called for a “France for the French”71) to make such statements, 
69 Quoted in Jeremy Jennings, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in 
Contemporary France, ”British Journal of Political Science Vol. 30 (2000): 582.
70 Quoted in Juge and Perez, “The Modern Colonial Politics,” p. 201. 
71 “Le Pen Lashes Immigrants”, BBC Online, April 26, 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1953888.stm. 
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that a more centrist politician could make such racist and prejudiced remarks is 
indicative of the political climate in the 1990s. Around the same time, former President 
Valerie Giscard d'Estaing described the immigration problem as an invasion problem. 
The legislation enacted during the 1990s reflects the attitude expressed by Chirac 
and d'Estaing. In 1991 the Constitutional Council ruled that a law which accepted the 
existence of the Corsican people was unconstitutional as the French Constitution only 
recognizes, “the French people, constituted of all French citizens, without any 
distinction of origin, race, or religion.”72 Whereas the 1981 law granting groups the right 
the organize was a step towards a more pluralist policy, this decision showed that any 
further steps were unlikely. Furthermore, in 1992, the constitution was amended to make 
French the official language of the republic.73 While the main motivation behind this 
amendment was the growing domination of the English language, it also had an impact 
on those living in France who do not speak French in that the French language became 
an official, constitutionally-mandated “marker of French citizenship and identity.” 74 
Now that the French language was constitutionally protected, the government moved on 
to reforming the nationality code. 
The political climate in the early 1990s created conditions that were favorable to 
the first reform of the nationality law since 1851. The Pasqua Law, passed in 1993, was 
a move toward a “zero immigration” policy. The law aimed to limit the number of 
foreigners who became French by making the naturalization process more difficult. In 
addition, the automatic right to French citizenship upon birth, jus soli, was revoked; 
children born to foreign parents in France now had to apply for citizenship themselves 
between the ages of 16 and 21. This law had the effect of restricting the access of 
immigrants to French citizenship and signaled a shift from an inclusive view of 
citizenship to an exclusive one. The 2003 Sarkozy Law further limited the access of 
immigrants to citizenship and residency. The law required that republican integration be 
demonstrated in order to obtain a 10 year residence card. This consisted of adequate 
knowledge of the French language and of the French republican principles. The law did 
72 Joppke, Christian. “Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and 
Anti-discrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany,” World Politics Vol. 59 
(January 2007): 261. 
73  French government, Article 2, French Constitution. Text available online at: 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp.
74 Loughlin, “State, Linguistic and Cultural Diversity,” p. 189.
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not just impact newcomers; families who had already been granted 10 year residency 
cards were now only given one year cards, with cards with longer validity issued to 
those who met the qualifications. The Sarkozy Law was passed with the aim of forcing 
foreigners to learn French and insert themselves into society. Thus, nationalization 
effectively became dependent on assimilation. 
The language and nationality reforms set the stage for the 2004 ban on religious 
symbols in schools. While the ban also included Christian and Jewish symbols, it was 
taken as an attack on Muslims as the more visible headscarf was included in the ban. In 
the French view, the ban does not violate the freedom of religion but brings the French 
public back to the ideal of unitary citizenship and secular French culture (Koopmans et 
al., 2005) and is a way to ensure equality and integration in the classroom. 
However, it was clear when riots broke out around France in 2005 that neither 
integration nor assimilation had taken place in many areas. Instead, youths were 
hopeless and disaffected, plagued by high levels of unemployment and life in ghettos. 
Sarkozy, in an October 2005 visit to the suburbs, was pelted with stones and bottles. In 
reaction, he called for these crime-ridden neighborhoods to be cleaned with a power 
hose, a remark that sparked much controversy. He also referred to the teenagers who 
participated in the riots, which broke out in November after the deaths of two teens who 
were hiding from the police, as “scum” and “thugs” (Juge and Perez, 2004). According 
to Juge and Perez, the riots demonstrated that, “the policies enacted in France have 
worsened the situation of immigrants.”75 The reactions of the immigrants to their 
economic situation and the perception that they were being discriminated against 
showed that the French policies of integration through assimilation had failed. While 
there are of course many immigrants who have fully integrated, the stories of those who 
have not are emphasized as failures. 
After the riots, the French immigration law was further restricted. In 2006, an 
immigrant bill, drafted by then Interior Minister Sarkozy, was introduced. The bill only 
allowed those with specific skills and talents to receive residence permits, forbid 
foreigners from living off state benefits, made foreign spouses wait longer to receive 
their identification cards, required that a contract committing immigrants to the French 
way of life be signed, and introduced DNA tests to prove family links for family 
75 Juge and Perez, “The Modern Colonial Politics”, p. 210.
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reunification immigration. The aim of this bill was to induce immigrants to assimilate 
while protecting French values and the French nation. In addition, in 2007 the Ministry 
of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development was created and 
given the objectives of controlling migration flows, favoring integration, and promoting 
the French identity. 
While the official rhetoric at this time was to promote integration, it was clear 
from the policies enacted that integration meant assimilation. Immigrants were meant to  
leave their identities at the border and become law-abiding, republican Frenchmen. In 
order to eradicate the increasing social disunity, which challenged the foundations of the 
French republic, a more forceful assimilation policy was enacted in the 2000s, mainly in 
opposition to those (Muslim) immigrants who had begun to assert their native identities. 
As the topic of immigration is such a hot topic in France, it is expected that the French 
public will have strong opinions which mirror those of their official representatives on 
this issue. The next section will explore this. 
3.1.3. French Public Opinion on Multiculturalism76
French public opinion on issues related to multiculturalism is significant because 
the right-wing populist politicians in France have attempted to capitalize on the fears 
and anxieties of the French public towards immigrants. These fears, coupled with the 
traditional French preference for cultural unity and amplified by the recent economic 
conditions, have created a feeding frenzy for politicians like Le Pen who recently 
returned to prominence with FN's strong showing in the regional elections in France.77 
While it is certainly clear that French politicians have strong views on issues related to 
multiculturalism, the views of the French public are less clear.
Roughly 65 million people live in France, of which approximately 8 per cent are 
foreign-born. Much like the British, the data presented by Citrin and Sides (2009) from 
the year 2007 shows that the French think there are many more foreigners in France (28 
76 Please see Appendix 1 for a data comparison on multiculturalism in the member 
states.
77  Jim Wolfreys, “Did Sarkozy Boost the Front National?” The Guardian. March 24, 
2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/24/nicolas-sarkozy-front-
national.
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per cent) than there actually are. Despite the overestimation of the number of foreigners, 
French people in general can be characterized as supportive of multiculturalism. Almost 
two-thirds of the French agree that people from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural 
life of France. This is significantly higher than the EU average and higher than the UK 
as well.78
Figure 8: People From Other Ethnic Groups Enrich Cultural Life
In contrast to the politicians, more than three-quarters of the French people desire a 
European Union that, in the year 2030, is more tolerant of ethnic and religious 
minorities. This is slightly higher than the EU average as well as higher than the other 
countries included in this study.79 
78 Eurobarometer 71, Spring 2009.
79 Ibid.
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Figure 9: A More or Less Tolerant Society in 2030
From this, it can be said that while many French politicians have been promoting 
assimilatory and exclusive policies with regard to immigrants, these policies are 
surprisingly not favored by the French public which seems to value diversity and 
tolerance. Also, when compared to the EU average, French attitudes toward intercultural 
dialogue are more cosmopolitan than the rest of the EU. In addition, a smaller 
percentage of the French are for intercultural dialogue but want to keep their roots. The 
amount not in favor of diversity is also less than the EU average.80
Figure 10: Attitudes Toward Multicultural Dialogue
While the data presented above presents a picture of a France that desires more 
80 Flash Eurobarometer No 217,  December 2007.
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multiculturalist policies, more French feel that the current situation between people from 
different cultural or religious backgrounds or nationalities is bad (54 per cent) than the 
EU average (45 per cent).81
In sum, the views of the French public are not entirely in line with the prominent 
politicians. The French people seem to be much more supportive of diversity and 
multiculturalism than the politicians are. It is then expected that the French people will  
also be more supportive of Turkish membership than the French government. 
3.2. The Link Between French Assimilation and the French Opposition to Turkish 
Accession82
3.2.1. French Government Opposition 
As indicated above, due to the lack of an EU level policy on multiculturalism, 
France has been free to pursue its own approach to multiculturalism. The French 
approach is drastically different from the British and Dutch preference for 
multiculturalist policies. In general, French politicians do not favor diversity and 
multiculturalism and have demonstrated their preference for integrationist and 
assimilatory policies with the goal of creating a single unified French culture. 
Influenced by the mission civilisatrice, the French government has attempted to 
assimilate the population through the spread of the French language and republican 
ideals. From this angle, neither its hostility toward ethnic and religious minorities nor its  
opposition to Turkish membership in the EU are surprising. Besides having concerns 
about Turkey being a Muslim country, the French also question whether Turkey can 
geographically as well as culturally be considered part of Europe. Moreover, the French 
government fears an influx of Turkish workers. The French concept of integration, in 
which the native identity is erased in order to form model French citizens, does not 
allow much space for immigrants, especially those who already have a strong national 
and/or religious identity like many Turks do. The restrictive immigration and forceful 
81 Eurobarometer 70, June 2010.
82  Please see Appendix 2 for a data comparison on the position on enlargement in the 
member states.
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assimilation policies of France make it hard for them to accept any new member states, 
let alone one with such a large, relatively poor, and 'different' population. 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the former French president who oversaw the drafting 
of the failed EU constitution, has strong views against Turkish membership. He believes 
that allowing Turkey to join, “would be the end of the European Union” due to the 
“different culture, a different approach, a different way of life”83 in Turkey. Jacques 
Chirac was more supportive of Turkish membership, but was under pressure to oppose it 
from the anti-enlargement right. 
After Sarkozy was elected president in 2007, the French government became 
staunchly anti-Turkey. In response to the possibility of Turkish accession, Sarkozy 
openly declared that, “Turkey has no place inside the European Union.”84  Much like 
d’Estaing, he opposes Turkish membership on the grounds that most of Turkey is not 
within continental Europe: “Europe must give itself borders, that not all countries have a 
vocation to become members of Europe, beginning with Turkey which has no place 
inside the European Union.” In another speech, Sarkozy expressed his desire not to be 
the one to, “tell French schoolchildren that the borders of Europe extend to Syria and 
Iraq.”85 But, as Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt pointed out, "If we judge 
Cyprus to be in Europe, although it is an island along Syria's shores, it is hard not to 
consider that Turkey is in Europe.”86 
Sarkozy has made several attempts to prevent Turkey from becoming a member. 
He suggested, along with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, that a 'privileged 
partnership' may be more suitable for this non-European country; another option is 
forming a Mediterranean Union: “The time has come to build together a Mediterranean 
Union that will be the bridge between Europe and Africa.”87 In a 2007 televised 
83  David Blair, “Will Turkey's EU membership Dream Come True?” The Daily  
Telegraph, 24 September 2009. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/6223612/Will-Turkeys-EU-
membership-dream-come-true.html. 
84 “Turkey Has No Place in the EU,” 15 January 2007. 
http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=159133.
85 David Blair, “Will Turkey's EU membership Dream Come True?”
86 Elitsa Vucheva, “Sarkozy Cancels Sweden Visit Over Turkey,” 29 May 2009. 
http://euobserver.com/9/28208. 
87 Katrin Bennhold, “Sarkozy's Proposal For Mediterranean Bloc Makes Waves,” The 
New York Times, 10 May 2007. 
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presidential debate he made his position on Turkey very clear: 
Negotiations began in 1964. We are in 2007. The time has rather come to tell the 
Turks whether we want them or if we don’t want them. For me actually, it is not 
a question of democracy, it is not at all a question of Muslims, of Islam. It is to 
say that it’s Asia, it is not Europe. One must tell clearly to this great people that 
is Turkey that they are meant to be the heart of the Union of the Mediterranean 
but not the heart of the European Union.88
He also proposed in 2007 that an independent body of 'wise men' be set up to discuss 
Europe's future. Sarkozy expected the reflection group to find Turkish accession 
undesirable which would thus devise a legitimate reason to deny Turkey membership; 
however, that proved not to be the case. The reflection group declared in its May 2010 
report that, “the Union must honor its commitments with regard to the current official 
candidates, including Turkey, and carry on with the negotiation process.”89 The 'wise 
men' did not come to the conclusion that Sarkozy had expected, but France continues to 
be hostile to Turkish accession, blocking five chapters in the accession negotiating 
framework. The French preoccupation with the borders of Europe is an attempt to 
prevent Turkish accession and is rooted in a deep fear of more non-French immigrant 
workers who, in the French view, do not subscribe to the republican and secular values 
of the French nation, nor do they speak French, presenting another - and a large - 
integration challenge. This shows a correlation between the French experience with 
multiculturalism and the government's position on the Turkish bid to join the EU. The 
French public shares some of the same opinions, despite being more receptive to 
diversity and immigrants. 
3.2.2. The French Public's Opposition
Based on the strong opposition to Turkish accession by the French government 
and the French tradition of assimilation and integration, it is expected that the French 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/europe/10iht-france.4.5656114.html. 
88 Nicholas Sarkozy, televised debate with Segolene Royal, 2 May 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/world/europe/07francequotes.html
89 Reflection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, “Project Europe 2030: Challenges 
and Opportunities, a Report to the European Council,” May 2010, p. 36.
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public will display similar levels of hostility toward immigrants and diversity. Even 
though the French public has proven to be more open to diversity and multiculturalism 
than the government, taking into consideration the French experience with immigration, 
the headscarf affair, the ban on religious symbols, and recent riots, a strong correlation 
between France's monocultural policy and the position of French citizens toward Turkey 
is predicted. 
First, it is important to determine the position of the French toward enlargement 
in general. France is well known for its aversion to enlargement, which dates back to the 
1960s when the British first applied for membership. Therefore, it is not unexpected that 
a majority of French people are against any further enlargement.90 
Figure 11: Future Enlargement to Include Other Countries
Likewise, a majority also oppose Turkish membership, with polls showing levels of 
opposition ranging from a slight majority to closer to 70 per cent. However, a good deal 
of French society is ambivalent, with around 40 per cent seeing Turkish membership as 
neither good nor bad.
90 Eurobarometer 71, Spring 2009.
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Figure 12: French Opinion on Turkey's Membership in the EU
 As the opinions of the French people mirror those of their elected representatives in 
these areas, it is somewhat surprisingly that the French people, while demonstrating 
strong levels of opposition to enlargement and particularly Turkish enlargement, are 
surprisingly tolerant. There is also some insecurity in society about increasing 
immigration, but the percentage is very small (6 per cent).91 Still, the data shows the 
French as only being slightly more concerned compared to the UK and the Netherlands 
with a common culture and history as important elements making up a European 
identity and are slightly less concerned about religion.92 However, the French do have 
strong views about Turkish culture with almost three of four agreeing that Turkey has 
such different values that it is not really part of the West. 
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
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Figure 13: French Opinion on Turkish Values
From this data, it can be concluded while there is a strong correlation between 
France's monocultural policy and its position towards Turkey, the same correlation does 
not exist for the French public. Despite their socialization into a monocultural, 
assimilatory society, the French have expressed their desire for a society that is more 
diverse and tolerant. Further research should be conducted in this discrepant area. 
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Chapter 4: The Unique Model of the Netherlands
“Wake up any expert on immigrant integration in the middle of the night and ask that  
person to name a country known for its multiculturalism. Ten to one that the answer will  
be Canada, Australia or the Netherlands.”93
“Stop the mass immigration from Muslim countries – not because the people are bad  
but because our cultural heritage and society, based on Christian and Judaic values, on  
humanity, is better than the Islamic [framework].”94
This chapter examines the unique Dutch approach to multiculturalism. A country 
that was once revered for its tolerance and was labeled as an 'immigrant-friendly 
country,' the Netherlands stands out both for its pioneering multiculturalist policy as 
well as for its recent turn towards more assimilatory measures. The sui generis pillar 
system influenced the Dutch version of multiculturalism in which immigrants were 
encouraged to maintain their identities. This chapter looks at the Dutch experience with 
its immigrant population, tying Dutch multiculturalism and the recent crises in the 
Netherlands to the Dutch position on enlargement. The Dutch “no” vote on the proposed 
constitution for the EU is particularly significant as it is also regarded as a no vote on 
further enlargement.95
93Han Entzinger.
94 Geert Wilders, speech: http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=1692&Itemid=1.
95 However, much like in France, post-referendum surveys (Flash Eurobarometer June 
2005) show that the most popular reason for voting against the proposed constitution 
was lack of information (32 per cent), whereas opposition to Turkish membership 
was the tenth most popular answer (3 per cent). 
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4.1. A Unique Model of Multiculturalism
For several decades, the Netherlands was the model for multicultural integration 
policy. The Dutch, like the other member states, have taken their own approach to 
multiculturalism and its related issues. Due to the lack of an EU level policy in these 
areas, Dutch policy is drastically different from French policy and much closer to the 
policies followed by the British. The Dutch propensity for supporting such policies 
stems from its history. The Netherlands has a long history of being a destination country 
for immigrants. It accepted immigrants and refugees starting in the sixteenth century. 
Soon after that, the Huguenots fled France for the Netherlands in the seventeenth 
century. Belgians sought refuge in the Netherlands during World War I as did Jews from 
Germany and Austria in the 1930s. 
Colonial immigration began after World War II when decolonization started. In 
1949, 300,000 Dutch citizens returned to the Netherlands after the independence of the 
former Dutch East Indies. Following Indonesia's independence in 1949, Indonesians 
also moved to the Netherlands. They were known as 'repatriates', since they were 
already familiar with Dutch society and culture. Without much difficulty and with the 
support of social policy measures, the repatriates integrated into Dutch society 
(Entzinger, 2006). More immigrants arrived from New Guinea in 1958. Starting in the 
1960s, gastarbeider (guest workers), mainly recruited by the Dutch government, began 
to arrive. At first they came from Italy and Spain, and later Turks and Moroccans 
immigrated to the Netherlands as guest workers as well. After Suriname gained 
independence from the Dutch Empire in 1975, 180,000 colonial immigrants left 
Suriname for the Netherlands (Vink, 2007). 
In the period after World War II, the Dutch government did not have an explicit 
policy to deal with either immigration or integration. It was assumed that repatriates 
would integrate easily and that the guest workers would remain in the country 
temporarily, work as needed, and then return home (Vink, 2007). This was due to the 
post-war perception that the Netherlands was not an immigration country (Bruquetas-
Callejo et al., 2007). Paradoxically, immigrants had been arriving in the Netherlands for 
centuries and would continue to arrive well into the 2000s. Despite this, post-war 
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immigration was meant to be temporary, and other than requiring residence and work 
permits, the Dutch government did not do much in terms of policy at the time. Not until 
the 1973 oil crisis was immigration restricted. Starting in 1973, only skilled workers 
viewed as beneficial to the Netherlands were given work permits (Bruquetas-Callejo et 
al., 2007). As a result of the economic conditions at the time plus the rise in domestic 
unemployment, the guest worker program came to an end in 1974. However, 
immigration still continued and the families of the guest workers began arriving in the 
Netherlands. 
Well into the 1970s the Netherlands was still in denial of the immigration 
situation. As it was still believed that the migrants were only staying temporarily, no 
attempts were made to assimilate or integrate them as was the case in other countries. 
The immigrants were encouraged to maintain their identities and cultural particularities  
so that they could reintegrate when they returned home. Integration into Dutch society 
was unnecessary due the transience of their stay. As such, the Dutch government started 
to implement programs aimed at cultural maintenance. The Mother Tongue and Culture 
Program began in 1974 and offered mother tongue school education for children of 
migrants. During the 1970s, categorical policy was employed to help the migrant 
workers retain their native identities. This included measures aimed at maintaining 
group cohesion and controlling family immigration. 
The reason that the Dutch government was so apt to allow and even encourage 
the migrants to retain their native identities and cultures was due to the Dutch tradition 
of pillarization (verzuiling). The Netherlands is domestically diverse with its own 
cultural and religious divisions. In the late nineteenth century, religious and ideological 
groups in the Netherlands started to organize themselves. They set up autonomous 
groups, and the elite leaders met to discuss common issues and to build coalitions to 
make decisions. The Catholics, Protestanst, and socialists, the main pillars, set up their 
own institutions. Separate education systems, trade unions, hospitals, social agencies, 
political parties, and media outlets were established for each pillar (Entzinger, 2007). 
The institutions were funded by the neutral state which was required to treat all pillars 
fairly. This system of “living apart together,”96 allowed all of the domestic groups to 
96 Han Entzinger, “Changing the Rules While the Game Is On: From Multiculturalism 
to Assimilation in the Netherlands.” Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Incorporation  
Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America (New York: Palgrave 
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keep their identities. It is important to note that it is widely agreed that the pillar  
structure had created a stable political system which is based on consensus building (van 
Zanden, 1998). 
The pillar system started to decline in the 1960s with the advent of 
secularization. As Dutch society secularized and became more well-educated, people 
were no longer interested in following the elite pillar leaders. Pillarization officially 
came to an end in 1983 when the new constitution ended financial support from the state 
to religious groups, thereby implementing the separation of church and state (Rath et al., 
1999). Some authors, such as Entzinger (2006), draw a connection between pillarization 
and early Dutch policy toward minorities, noting that: 
it was generally believed that what did not work anymore for the population as a 
whole might be good for the migrants who, after all, were perceived as 
fundamentally different from the Dutch and as people in need of 
emancipation.”97 
The pillar structure and the policy toward minorities share similarities: the 
support measures provided, the doctrine of equal treatment, and the freedom to retain 
one's identity.  Moreover, the basic philosophy is practically the same: organize those 
residing in the Netherlands by religion or ethnicity, treat them equally, and leave them to 
themselves. However, others, like Vink (2007) and Rath et al. (1999), suggest that this 
was not the case. Muslims had arrived in the Netherlands too late to take advantage of 
the pillar structure, and besides, they were treated much differently than the pillared 
groups were. By connecting the Dutch policy toward immigrant to pillarization provides 
“an idealized, and perhaps somewhat naive, picture of the Netherlands as a country with 
a very accommodating and 'immigrant-friendly' integration policy.”98 These two views 
remain in contention today. 
Interestingly, the 1979 Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) report 
on ethnic minorities did not recommend integrating the newcomers, as they are referred 
to in the Netherlands, into the pillar system. Up until 1979, the policy had been to 
encourage the minorities, who were supposed to return to their home countries, to retain 
their identities to the extent that they were provided with education in their native 
Macmillan, 2006) p. 123.
97 Ibid., p. 126.
98 Maarten P. Vink, “Dutch 'Multiculturalism Beyond the Pillarization Myth,” Political  
Studies Review Vol. 5 (2007): 343. 
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languages. The 1980s marked a shift in policy as the Dutch government realized that the 
guest workers had settled permanently and were not planning to leave. In addition, 
immigration had increased in the 1980s as Dutch citizens from the Netherland Antilles 
and Aruba arrived, as did the families of the Moroccan and Turkish guest workers who 
had decided to stay permanently. Applications from asylum seekers had also increased. 
Thus, with the increase in immigration and the realization that the guest workers 
had become permanent settlers, a different approach emerged. The historic 1983 
Minorities Memorandum officially committed the Dutch government to 
multiculturalism (Phillips, 2007), making the Netherlands, “Europe's most explicitly 
multicultural regime.”99 The Ethnic Minorities Policy (EMP) aimed to integrate the 
newcomers while maintaining their distinct identities (Duyvendak, 2005). This policy 
recognized that the migrants were different and occupied a low social position. 
Therefore, they were the targets of the new EMP which included both socio-economic 
and socio-cultural components. Besides targeting the former guest workers and post-
colonial immigrants, some native groups were also included in the realm of the EMP 
due to their low status. With the implementation of the EMP, the Dutch government 
recognized these minority groups as part of Dutch society, which according to the 1983 
Minorities Memorandum made the country multicultural (Vink, 2007).
The basic aim of the EMP was to achieve socio-economic equality and well as 
equity in culture and religion and to increase participation in politics. It, according to 
Bruquetas-Callejo et al. (2007), included an impressive array of policies. The socio-
economic aspect included provisions to improve the newcomers' prospects in education, 
housing and the labor market. It also opposed discrimination and unequal treatment 
which was codified in the 1983 Dutch constitution which in Article 1 provides for equal 
treatment of all and outlaws discrimination. The socio-cultural component encouraged 
the preservation of the native culture, religion and language of the newcomers and 
supported their organizations (Duyvendak et al., 2005). 
The tradition of accommodating the newcomers continued in the mid 1980s. A 
1985 law granted local voting rights for immigrants after five years of residence. This 
led to the Netherlands being viewed as one of the most 'immigrant-friendly' countries in 
Europe as other countries did not afford these sort of rights to new residents (Vink, 
99 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007) p. 6.
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2007). Another 'immigrant-friendly' policy was enacted in 1986 when the nationality 
law was modified, replacing the 1892 Act; a more jus soli approach made it easier for 
immigrants and their children to become citizens of the Netherlands. By the late 1980s, 
Hindu and Islamic schools had been set up in the Netherlands, exemplifying its 
multiculturalist character. The particularities of minority groups, in line with 
multiculturalist policy, were supported and they were not asked or forced to assimilate. 
However, towards the end of the 1980s, criticism of the multiculturalist policies started 
to mount. 
4.1.1. Dutch Multiculturalism in Crisis
Two major assassinations in the early 2000s drew attention to the fact that Dutch 
multiculturalism was in crisis; however, the crisis actually started to develop at least a 
decade before. In 1989, the WRR issued a report on the EMP. The report stated that 
despite the efforts of the EMP immigrant unemployment had continued to be a problem 
(more than one-third of all Turkish and Moroccan immigrants were unemployed by the 
end of the 1980s). Plus, it found many immigrants to be low-skilled. In order to solve 
these problems, the report suggested more requirements be placed on the immigrants. 
This marked another turn in Dutch policy which would be realized in the 1990s. While 
in the late 1980s other European countries were advocating the return home of their 
guest workers, who were no longer needed and had become a burden due to the 
stagnated economy, the Dutch felt indebted to the foreign workers who had helped their 
country so much (Entzinger, 2006). The Netherlands had begun to feel the strain 
immigration was placing on the country, but, as Entzinger put it, “making mention of 
this in public was widely considered to be politically incorrect, if not racist.”100 
With the acknowledgment that the migrants were there stay, the Dutch 
government, in the wake of the 1989 WRR report, moved toward a more integrationist 
version of multiculturalism. The group cohesion that was a priority in the early 1980s 
became less of a priority, as did the maintenance of original identities. As the report had 
noted, high levels of unemployment and relatively unskilled immigrants presented a 
100Entzinger, “Changing the Rules,” p. 125.
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problem. In the 1990s, the Dutch government unveiled an Integration Policy (IP) which 
aimed to reduce these disparities. The IP sought to increase the participation of 
immigrants in both the education system and the labor market (Duyvendak et al., 2005). 
The focus of the IP was much more socio-economic than the EMP which had more of a 
cultural focus. With the introduction of the IP, the Dutch government demonstrated that 
it was no longer interested in institutionalizing ethnic diversity; rather, the goals in the 
1990s were to provide immigrants with more access to institutions while encouraging 
their participation in the economy and intergroup contact. 
Several laws were implemented in the 1990s which showed the Dutch 
government's commitment to multiculturalism and the integration of its minority 
population. In 1992, newcomers were allowed to hold dual citizenship, which 
exemplified the extent to which the government relished multiculturalism. In 1994, the 
Equal Treatment Act was passed, creating the Equal Treatment Commission which was 
authorized to investigate cases of direct and indirect discrimination (Vink, 2007). It also 
made direct and indirect discrimination illegal in employment, access to goods and 
services, and education. This included discrimination based on race and nationality as 
well as religious beliefs, political opinion, sex, sexual orientation, and civil status. 
In the same year, the Law to Promote Proportional Employment for Minorities 
was also enacted. This required public and private firms of thirty-five or more 
employees to register the ethnic origins of their staff and develop annual action plans 
and targets for improving the representation of minorities in the labor market. Certain 
groups were designated as target groups in this law: Surinamese, Antilleans and 
Arubans, Turks, Moroccans, ex-Yugoslavs, Romani, and refugees. The reason a quota 
system was preferred at this time was because the voluntary agreements that had been 
signed between employers and unions to encourage minority employment had failed to 
improve the situation. Therefore, the government stepped in to help improve the 
situation. Such government involvement was characteristic of the 1990s. However, this 
law proved to be extremely unpopular with employers, who compared it to the forced 
registration that was required under Nazi occupation (Joppke, 2007). By the end of 
1996, compliance with this law was rare, as was enforcement, and it was allowed to 
expire in 2004.  
Throughout the 1990s, the Netherlands slowly added more civic integration 
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aspects to its famed multiculturalism and began to stop encouraging difference. As 
immigrants, now arriving from a growing array of countries, continued to arrive in the 
Netherlands, more ethnic groups were represented in Dutch society. The government 
could not support only some of the groups, and it was nearly impossible to support all 
the groups. Besides, it had become clear that the emancipation approach embodied by 
the EMP had only encouraged segregation and separation and provided no solution to 
the problem of immigrant unemployment (Joppke, 2004). 
The concept of civic integration originated in the Netherlands as a way to 
compensate for what the multiculturalist measures had failed to achieve. According to 
Joppke, civic integration was, “a response to the obvious failure of one of Europe's most 
pronounced policies of multiculturalism to further the socio-economic integration of 
immigrants and their offspring.”101 Instead of promoting separate realms for minorities, 
as they did in the 1980s, the Dutch government began to implement policies which 
emphasized active citizenship, rather than cultural maintenance, and participation. In 
addition, the onus was shifted to the immigrants, who became responsible for their own 
participation and integration in society. 
Civic integration policies began to take hold in the late 1990s. In 1997, the Dutch 
government repealed the law which allowed dual citizenship, suggesting that stronger 
allegiance to the Dutch state began to be preferred at this time. The July 1998 Exclusion 
Law, also referred to as the Linkage Act, required legal residency in order to make use 
of public goods (Doomernik, 2005). This act was implemented in order to reduce the 
abuse of the Dutch welfare system by illegal immigrants. However, this law was viewed 
by many as, “unnecessary, immoral, unworkable,”102 and received low levels of public 
support, displaying the Dutch predilection for providing for the newcomers. As a result, 
the bill was expanded to allow access to education for children and health care for 
newcomers in the Netherlands without legal residency (Duyvendak, 2005). Most 
significantly, the 1998 Newcomer Integration Act introduced a mandatory twelve month 
integration course for most non-EU newcomers. The course included 600 hours of 
Dutch language instruction, lessons in civic integration, and preparation for joining the 
101 Joppke, “The Retreat,” p. 249. 
102  Maria Bruquetas-Callejo, Blanca Garces-Mascarenas, Rinus Penninx, and Peter 
Scholten. “Policymaking Related to Immigration and Integration: The Dutch Case.” 
IMISCOE Working Paper No 15. March 2007, p. 7. 
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Dutch labor market (Joppke, 2007). This policy continued to be refined and developed 
well into the 2000s.
Despite the introduction of more civic integrationist measures in the 1990s, the 
Netherlands was still more or less committed to multiculturalism. In 1997, the Law on 
the Consultation of Minority Policy reaffirmed the government's dedication to 
developing a “harmonious” multicultural society. In addition, a number of Islamic and 
Hindu schools had been opened, and by the end of the 1990s there were approximately 
450 mosques in the Netherlands (Vink, 2007), which showed that the government was 
still employing some policies designed to preserve cultural identity. While the Dutch 
approach to multiculturalism began to change in the 1990s, the 2000s marked the real 
turning point. 
Between 1995 and 2005 the non-western population in the Netherlands had 
increased by 44 per cent and totaled 10 per cent of the total population. In contrast, 
immigration from western countries had only increased by 7 per cent (Doomernik, 
2005). This drastic increase, combined with the growing perception that the 
multiculturalist policies were not working, motivated the government to complete the 
transition from multiculturalism to civic integration. It is important to note that this  
move towards civic integration started before the rise of right-wing populism. 
By the year 2000, two opposing views on multiculturalism in the Netherlands 
had taken shape. One side, the pure multiculturalists believed that progress had been 
made in all areas. The children of the immigrants were integrating into Dutch society 
and doing well in school and also economically. The fact that many Turks and 
Moroccans still identified with their home countries and as Muslims meant that 
multiculturalism had been successful. It showed, as Entzinger wrote in his aptly titled 
essay on multiculturalism in the Netherlands, “Changing the Rules While the Game Is 
On,” that, “institutional integration could indeed go hand in hand with preservation of 
the original cultural identity.”103 The other strand, which began to dominate the 
discourse, believed that Dutch multiculturalism had failed. In January 2000, Paul 
Scheffer, a member of the Labor Party, wrote “The Multicultural Tragedy” explaining 
what had gone wrong. The multiculturalist policies, instead of encouraging the 
newcomers to become part of Dutch society, had created an ethnic underclass of people 
103Entzinger, “Changing the Rules,” p. 126.
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who were unable to and uninterested in integrating. According to Entzinger, “Scheffer 
voiced the concern that many Dutch people felt, but did not express about continuing 
immigration, stagnant integration, increased segregation and a rapidly growing Muslim 
population.”104 Scheffer criticized the elite policymakers for not previously requiring 
immigrants to adapt and blamed the newcomers, particularly the Muslims, for the 
country's economic problems. He recommended a 'civilization offensive', which would 
require immigrants to know more about Dutch history and culture, as the solution to the 
growing immigration problem. Critics blasted Scheffer for being stereotypical and 
unaware of the actual policies, but as Entzinger put it, “his outcry is generally seen as 
the beginning of a dramatic turnaround in the Dutch public debate and in Dutch policy-
making regarding immigration and integration.”105 Thus, following Scheffer's article, 
multiculturalism and the perceived failure of the immigrants to integrate became major  
political issues in the Netherlands. 
Scheffer's view proved to be popular in the 2000s. Following September 11th, 
anti-immigrant and anti-Islam politician Pim Fortuyn grew in popularity. His political  
program was considered to be somewhat radical, in terms of its anti-immigrant 
sentiment, but he was quite popular with the Dutch citizens who were dissatisfied with 
politics in general; his populist rhetoric appealed to such people. Fortuyn claimed not to 
be against immigrants, but concerned that the influx of 'non-western people' in the 
Netherlands would hurt Dutch values. Continued immigration would only make this 
worse (Entzinger, 2006). Fortuyn, stating that the Netherlands was 'full', endorsed a 
policy of zero-immigration. Unwelcome in other political parties due to his statements 
against Muslim immigrants, Fortuyn formed his own political party, List Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF). Just before the 2002 elections, Fortuyn was assassinated. Despite this, LPF still 
did well in the elections, claiming 26 out of 150 seats; it had the second highest number 
of seats after the Christian Democrats. A partner in the Christian Democrats' 
government, the new government espoused anti-immigration views, criticizing the 
immigrants for not doing more to integrate themselves. This unstable government soon 
fell, and while LPF was not a partner in the new government, it continued the anti-
immigrant trend by restricting immigration and making it more difficult to obtain a 
residence permit. Consequently, immigration began to drop in 2003.  
104 Ibid., p. 127. 
105 Ibid., p. 128. 
71
After Fortuyn's death, his followers continued to advance anti-immigration 
views. Other politicians and well-known figures in the Netherlands chimed in with 
similar opinions. Director Theo van Gogh, also a critic of multiculturalism with strong 
views against Islam, produced a film entitled Submission. Written by Somalian-born 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Muslim who became a Dutch politician, Submission drew 
criticism from Muslims worldwide for its portrayal of Islam as a religion which 
perpetuates violence against women. In November 2004, van Gogh was assassinated by 
Mohammed Bouyeri, a dual citizen of the Netherlands and Morocco, who according to 
most accounts was well-integrated into Dutch society (Browne, 2005). 
These assassinations coupled with the international terrorist attacks of the early 
2000s garnered support for the right-wing parties in the Netherlands. Geert Wilders' 
Freedom party reported gains in the November 2006 elections as well as in the June 
2010 elections. Wilders, who is even more vocal than Fortuyn was about his hatred of 
Islam, is supported by a significant portion of the Dutch electorate (47 per cent 
according to 2005 polls106).
How can the drastic and more or less sudden shift in policy be explained? 
Entzinger (2006) links the economic crisis of the early 2000s to the rise in anti-
immigrant and anti-immigration sentiment. The immigrants, as was the case in other 
European countries, became the scapegoats and were blamed for the economic troubles. 
Plus, the growing number of immigrants, and particularly the non-western immigrants, 
made the native Dutch feel like they were the minority in some areas of the Netherlands. 
The populist politicians picked up on these fears and exploited them, encouraging the 
public to also fear the encroachment of non-western values in Dutch society which 
would eventually lead to the demise of western liberal democracy. Vink, however, notes 
that these fears were nothing new: Fortuyn, van Gogh, and Wilders had, “radicalized a 
discourse...that had been developing for over a decade.”107 The violence that erupted in 
the 2000s showed that multiculturalism had failed. The combination of these factors put 
Dutch multiculturalism in crisis which is where it still stands today. The next section 
will explore the current policies and the recent positions of the Dutch government. 
106 “Dutch Divided on Wilders Agenda,” NIS News Bulletin, 15 March 2005, available 
online at: http://www.nisnews.nl/dossiers/immigration/150305_869.htm.
107 Vink, “Dutch 'Multiculturalism,” p. 339.
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4.1.2. The Dutch Government's Positions on Multiculturalism
The Netherlands has undergone a drastic transformation with regards to 
multiculturalism and the view on minority groups. One of the pioneers of 
multiculturalism, the Dutch government first employed a policy grounded in the 
tradition of pillarization which allowed and encouraged the immigrant groups to 
maintain separate lives and identities. Originally implemented based on the expected 
short-term stay of the guest worker migrants, the Dutch government allowed and 
encouraged them to retain their identities so that they would not have any trouble fitting 
in in their home countries when they returned home. After it was acknowledged that 
most were not going to return home, the Dutch government continued to accommodate 
them, aiding them in setting up their own schools and organizations. 
Throughout the 1980s, the immigrant-friendly policies continued. In the 1990s, 
the effectiveness of the multicultural policies was called into question, due to problems 
with unemployment and labor market integration, and the government enacted policies 
of civic integration while continuing to declare the Netherlands a multicultural country.  
As the economy soured and immigrants were blamed for the problems, the pro-
assimilation and anti-immigration right-wing populist politicians grew in popularity.  
Geert Wilders still maintains a strong following today and has recently announced his 
plans to create an anti-Islam “International Freedom Alliance.”108 According to 
Doomernik, “this change in perspective allows the government to question the 
willingness among immigrants to participate, and to propose a system by which to 
measure the distance (or nearness) of immigrants vis-à-vis Dutch society.”109 The Dutch 
government, influenced partially by the rise of right-wing populism, has enacted more 
civic integration style legislation which now includes components related to loyalty and 
Dutch values. The recent policy has seemed to follow the 'civilization offensive' 
trajectory suggested by Scheffer.
In response to the Dutch government's request for advice on the growing 
immigration problem, in 1990 the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government 
108 See http://geertwildersinternationalfreedomalliance.com.
109 Doomernik, J., “The State of Multiculturalism in the Netherlands,” Canadian 
Diversity/Diversite Canadienne, Vol. 4 , No. 1 (2005): 35.
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Policy issued a report, “Immigrant Policy: Summary of the 36th Report,” on this matter. 
The report declared that in spite of the introduction of more restrictive immigration 
policies, immigration had become a fact of life in the Netherlands. Thus, it was crucial 
that education and training programs for immigrants be improved to increase their 
participation in the labor market. At this time, the policy can still be regarded as 
multiculturalist or integrationist. The report warned that the failure to invest in the future 
of the newcomers would lead to the, “further growth of an ethnic subproletariat, with 
rising crime and costly welfare facilities.”110 This report would influence government 
policy toward immigrants for several years.  
Even before Scheffer wrote his piece on the failure of multiculturalism in 2000, 
the “Purple” Coalition government (Labour [PvdA], Liberals [VVD], and Democrats 
[D66]) of the mid 1990s had shifted from respecting the diversity of the newcomers to 
encouraging their social participation under the IP. As a result, culture became a private 
matter and the focus was on improving the participation rate of immigrants in the 
workforce. The 1994 Integration of Ethnic Minorities Policy used the term 'integration' 
for the first time, a term that was previously thought to be too assimilationist. With the 
introduction of this act, the Purple Coalition government signaled that it was no longer 
committed to the preservation of native cultures; instead, this became the responsibility 
of individuals and groups (Phillips, 2007). In addition, mother tongue teaching, a 
cornerstone of the EMP, was no longer allowed in core subjects and later eliminated in 
its entirety from school curricula. The failure of the immigrants to integrate was 
attributed to their poor knowledge of the Dutch language and of Dutch society. A free 
twelve month inburgering (civic integration) course was instituted for immigrants from 
non-EU countries with the 1998 Newcomer Integration Law (Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers) (Joppke, 2007). The course consisted of 600 hours of Dutch language 
instruction, civic education, and labor market preparation. The state continued to move 
further away from multiculturalist policies, later placing the burden of finding a course, 
which was only offered by private organizations, and registering for it on the 
immigrants. The newcomers were also required to pay for the mandatory courses which 
for many were prohibitively expensive. 
After the Purple Coalition collapsed, the Christian Democrat Appeal (CDA) 
110 WRR, “Immigrant Policy: Summary of the 36th Report,” 1990, p. 6. 
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party came to power in 2002 under Prime Minister Balkenende. The Balkenende 
government continued on the path toward more civic integration with its immigration 
policy 'New Style', ignoring the findings of the 2002 Parliamentary Committee of 
Inquiry on the Effectiveness of Integration, also known as the Blok Commission. The 
Blok Commission found that integration in the Netherlands had been relatively 
successful and progress had been made in employment, education, and housing.111 But, 
the integration of immigrants was, for the most part, not due to government policy as 
many recommendations and laws had been ignored. Instead of following the 
Commission's recommendations on tackling the growing problems of school 
segregation through updated housing polices and public sector employment, the report's 
findings were brushed aside in favor of more coercive measures to induce integration, 
mainly due to the political climate at the time (Fortuyn had been assassinated two years 
earlier).
The growing anti-immigrant sentiment influenced the Balkenende government to 
institute policies which required even more civic integration from the newcomers. The 
March 2006 Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet Inburgering Buitenland) further 
restricted immigration through family reunification, requiring family members applying 
from abroad to join their family in the Netherlands to apply for a residence permit 
(€800) and take the civic integration exam (€350), which tests knowledge of Dutch 
language and society, in their home country (Vink, 2007). As many countries lacked 
Dutch language and society education programs, the integration test became a, “perfect 
tool for preventing unwanted family immigration,”112 mainly from Turkey and Morocco, 
as immigrants from those countries were the most likely to seek spouses in their, or their 
parents', country of origin. 
A few months later, the December 2006 Civic Integration Act (Wet Inburgering) 
made the civic integration course and exam mandatory for 'old-comers' as well. 
Recognizing that the old act had failed to integrate people and that not many people had 
joined the voluntary courses, this act made the class and exam mandatory for non-
Dutch/EU citizens between the ages of 16 and 65, even if they had lived in the 
111 “Commission: Many Immigrants Integrated Despite Govt Policy,” NIS News 
Bulletin, 20 January 2004. Available online at: 
http://www.nisnews.nl/immigration/200104_692.htm. 
112 Joppke, “The Transformation,” p. 50. 
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Netherlands for several years (those educated in the Netherlands are exempt). It also 
applies to those naturalized citizens receiving welfare benefits and those with religious 
professions. New and old-comers are personally responsible for finding an integration 
course and passing the exam, and those who fail to take the course and exam are subject 
to a fine of up to €1000 and may be prohibited from obtaining a residence permit (Vink, 
2007). This link between immigration control and integration was, according to Joppke, 
“an entirely new vision of immigrant integration.”113 Now, the failure to integrate could 
lead to the denial of residency in the Netherlands. 
A speech by Prime Minister Balkenende in 2007 echoed this new vision. 
Balkenende, drawing attention to the failure of the Netherlands to address integration, 
noted that, “a multicultural society does not automatically function smoothly.” The 
shock of van Gogh's assassination led to the acknowledgment that shared values are 
necessary for societal cohesion: “there must be a foundation of shared values, a basis 
which guarantees a peaceful growth of diversity.”114 This speech, when compared to the 
policies of the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrates a drastic reversal of position. The Dutch 
government has, in a few short decades, gone from a model of multiculturalism to a 
quasi-assimilationist model. With suggestions by high level officials such as the former 
Immigration and Integration Ministry Rita 'Iron Lady' Verdonk that only Dutch should 
be allowed to be spoken on the streets, it seems that, as Doomernik put it, 
“multiculturalism [has been] relegated to the dunghill of political history.” 115 The 
question of whether this major shift in policy is supported by the Dutch public, known 
for its tolerance and progressive values, is important and will be discussed in the next 
section. 
4.1.3. The Perception of the Dutch Public on Multiculturalism116
Following two assassinations and a string of international terrorist attacks, it is 
113 Ibid., p. 250. 
114 Jan Peter Balkenende, speech at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 
Ottawa, 11 June 2007. 
115 Doomernik, “The State,” p. 35.
116 Please see Appendix 1 for a data comparison on multiculturalism in the member 
states.
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expected that the Dutch perception of multiculturalism has changed. A significant 
portion of the Dutch population (total population is 16.5 million as of 2010) is foreign 
born (11 per cent of Dutch pop are foreign-born, if the second generation is included it 
rises to 20 per cent) with those from non-western origins (an official Dutch statistical 
term) numbering more than 1.6 million (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2010).
Despite the recent history and demographic makeup of the Netherlands, both 
studies and statistics show that Dutch attitudes toward multiculturalism have remained 
steady; in fact, some of the strongest levels of support in the EU for multiculturalism are 
found in the Netherlands. Breugelmans and van de Vijver (2009), in a study of attitudes 
toward multiculturalism between 1999 and 2007, found little evidence of any change in 
attitude.117 This is in contrast to Entzinger (2006) who suggests that since 2000 public 
opinion has become increasingly sensitive to what are viewed as attempts (mainly by 
Muslims) to destroy western values. 
The Eurobarometer data backs up Breugelmans and van de Vijver's findings. The 
Netherlands has significantly more multicultural views that the European average, the 
UK and France in a number of areas. Two-thirds of people in the Netherlands agree that 
people from other groups enrich their cultural life which is much greater than the 
European average, France and the UK.118 
Figure 14: People From Other Ethnic Groups Enrich Cultural Life
117 Seger M. Breugelmans and Fons J.R. van de Vijver. “Stability of Major Attitudes 
Toward Multiculturalism in the Netherlands Between 1999 and 2007,” Applied  
Psychology: An International Review Vol. 58, No. 4 (2009): 664.
118 Eurobarometer 71, Spring 2009. 
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More people (65 per cent) also believe that immigration can play an important role in 
developing greater understanding and tolerance with the rest of the world 
(Eurobarometer 71). In addition, Dutch people have a much more cosmopolitan outlook 
on intercultural dialogue compared to the European average and fewer support 
cosmopolitan views but want to keep their roots. 
Figure 15: Attitudes Toward Multicultural Dialogue
However, there is an even split on whether relations between groups in the Netherlands 
are good or bad (Eurobarometer 70). It is expected that the views of the government and 
public on multiculturalism are related to their position on Turkish membership in the 
EU.
4.2. The Link Between Dutch Multiculturalism and Dutch Support For Turkey's 
Accession
4.2.1. Dutch Government Support 
The Dutch government, which prides itself on its consensus style of decision-
making, is supportive of Turkish membership in the EU. Under the 2004 Dutch 
Presidency of the European Council, the EU leaders agreed to start membership 
negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. Despite the assassinations, anti-immigration 
sentiment, and the 2005 rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, the vast majority of 
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Dutch politicians support Turkey's bid to join the EU. Due to the Dutch experience with 
multiculturalism, the Dutch politicians view Turkey's 'diversity' as a benefit and, related 
to the Dutch tradition for toleration and preservation of cultural distinctiveness, see any 
reference to Turkey's religious or cultural differences as discrimination. Thus, despite a 
few conspicuous dissenters, the official government position is one of support for 
Turkey. 
A number of prominent Dutch politicians have declared their support for Turkish 
membership in the EU. In a July 2004 speech to the European Parliament, marking the 
start of the Netherlands' Presidency, former Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende 
described the Dutch commitment to judging the Turkish case for accession fairly and 
without prejudice: 
The decision must be arrived at honestly, under the ground rules to which we 
previously, in 2002, firmly committed ourselves. That means strict application 
of the criteria laid down, but without inventing any new criteria. We must not 
allow ourselves to be guided by fear, e.g. of Islam. Raising barriers to any 
particular religion does not fit in with Europe's shared values.119
In the same speech, Balkenende promised that the Netherlands would try its best to 
eliminate cultural obstacles in order to provide a better social and economic future for 
all of Europe. The Dutch Minister for European Affairs Atzo Nicolai concurred, 
declaring that religious arguments should not play a role in Turkey's accession to the 
EU. He drew attention to Turkey's secular state, “Turkey has organized the secular 
character of the state very clearly. In this respect only France could be compared to it.  
Other European states could even take it as an example.”120 Former MEP Social 
Democrat Lousewies van der Laan also agreed and emphasized the importance of 
admitting Muslim Turkey into the EU: “If the Turks do not think they are genuinely 
welcome in the EU, we risk strengthening the wrong powers in Turkey. We need the 
Turks precisely because they are Muslim.”121 Clearly linked to the Dutch tradition of 
allowing newcomers to the Netherlands to keep their cultural, religious, and ethnic 
differences, these politicians all treat the religion of the majority of Turks as either a 
119 Jan Peter Balkenende, speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 21 July 2004. 
120 Atzo Nicolai, quoted in “Beyond Enlargement Fatigue? The Dutch Debate on 
Turkish Accession,” European Stability Initiative, 24 April 2006, p. 6. 
121 Lousewies van der Laan, quoted in, “Who's Who In the Debate on Turkey? The 
Netherlands” European Stability Initiative, 22 February 2006, p. 12.
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non-issue or as a benefit. This is in stark contrast to the French and closer to the British 
position.
Beside Turkey's religious and cultural differences, another cause for concern has 
been the fear of a massive influx of Turkish immigrants once Turkey becomes a 
member. The Netherlands has traditionally been quite friendly to its immigrant 
population so it comes as no surprise that immigration is not viewed as a major issue by 
most politicians. Nicolai, noting that immigration is thought to be a bigger concern for 
the Dutch than religion or Turkey's size, points out that safeguard clauses on migration 
from Turkey can be applied if necessary, much like they were in the past two 
enlargements. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Dutch minister for Economic Affairs, brings up a 
valid point regarding the concerns over immigration: 
after the accession of Spain and Portugal, we were surprised to see the large-
scale remigration of Spanish and Portuguese workers who were working in 
countries such as the Netherlands and Germany. Is it unlikely that Turks now 
living in Germany and the Netherlands consider a return to Turkey?122 
Due to the mostly favorable history of the Netherlands with immigrants and the 
politicians' in depth understanding of the immigration issue with regards to Turkey, 
immigration has not been as big of an issue at the governmental level as it is in France. 
Wim Duisenberg, the Dutch former president of the European Central Bank, 
wrote an article in summer 2005 calling for Turkish membership in the EU. He 
declared: 
For me, Europe's integration of Muslim Turkey into its political union is the 
same sort of question of peace that [the founders of the EU] successfully 
confronted. […] Today, Europe needs peace between cultures as much as it once 
needed peace between nations and it is for this reason that we must welcome 
Turkey into our midst.123
In sum, the politicians who support the Turkish bid to join the EU display evidence of 
having been influenced by the Dutch multicultural policies. The absence of an EU level 
policy, combined with the Dutch experience with immigration can explain the high level 
of support at the government level in the Netherlands. They support tolerance, value 
diversity, are not so concerned with immigration, and do not display any indication of 
assimilationist tendencies. The underlying theme is that cultural pluralism and 'unity in 
122 Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, quoted in, “Who's Who,” p. 18.
123 Wim Duisenberg, quoted in, “Who's Who,” p. 26.
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diversity' are important characteristics of the EU and Turkey would only add to that. 
However, the view of those politicians opposed to Turkey's accession is quite the 
opposite. 
From Pim Fortuyn to Geert Wilders, Dutch right-wing populists have become 
well known for their opposition to enlargement. Wilders, infamous for his abhorrence of 
Islam, declared in 2009 that,” Turkey as (an) Islamic country should never be in the EU, 
not in 10 years, not in a million years.”124 Former Dutch European Commissioner Frits 
Bolkestein shared similar views, noting that Turkish accession would put Europe “in 
danger of being 'Islamized'” and declaring that, if Turkey were to join the EU, “the 
liberation of Vienna in 1683 would have been in vain.”125 The anti-Turkey discourse in 
the Netherlands is reminiscent of Scheffer's call for a 'civilization offensive' and anti-
multiculturalism. The anti-Turkey rhetoric has also resonated with the public to a certain 
extent. Public opinion on Turkish accession will be discussed in the next section. 
4.2.2. Dutch Public Uncertainty126
Despite the ongoing 'crisis of multiculturalism' in the Netherlands, Dutch people 
are more open to Turkish accession than the average European. The level of support for 
Turkish membership in higher in than that of France and is either higher or lower than 
the level of British support depending on the poll. 
124 Mike Corder, “Geert Wilders' Far-Right Party Gains in EU Assembly Exit Polls, 
The Huffington Post, 6 April 2009. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/04/geert-
wilders-farright-pa_n_211554.html.
125 Adrian Hamilton, “Europe Must Not Reject Turkey Now, The Independent, 9 
September 2004. http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/adrian-
hamilton/europe-must-not-reject-turkey-now-544263.html.
126 Please see Appendix 2 for a data comparison on the opinion of enlargement in the 
member states.
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Figure 16: Turkey's Membership in the EU
However, those who support Turkish membership are still in the minority, with polls 
showing the percentage supporting membership ranging from 20 per cent to 45 per cent 
(Eurobarometer). The most common view is that membership is neither good nor bad.
Figure 17: Dutch Opinion on Turkey's Membership in the EU
Those who support membership do so because of the ways in which Turkey will have to 
adapt to be able to join (64 per cent) and with just over half (56 per cent) in support due 
to their belief that all European countries have the right to join the EU.127 However, 
when asked about support for Turkish membership if Turkey complies with all the 
127 Maurice de Hand, “Turkey in the EU,” 23 August 2004. www.peil.nl.
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conditions, then a majority do support Turkish accession. 
Figure 18: Accession of Turkey if the Conditions Are Complied With
Somewhat surprisingly, given the Dutch support for multiculturalism, a majority is 
against membership. Two-thirds of those who are opposed to membership point out 
Turkey's religious differences and categorize Turkey as not being European.128 In 
addition, more believe that Turkish values are too different to allow Turkey to be a part 
of the West:
Figure 19: Dutch Opinion on Turkish Values
128  Ibid.
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The generally higher levels of support by the Dutch public for Turkish 
membership can be attributed to the multicultural experience. The Dutch, more than the 
British, French or the European average, believe that immigrants can play an important 
role in developing tolerance and understanding with the rest of the world.129 This is 
likely due to a positive view of and experience with multiculturalism. Despite their 
desire for a more tolerant society, the majority still do not support Turkish membership. 
The public is split on Turkish enlargement, much like they are split on some other issues 
tied to multiculturalism: some want a more tolerant society while others are not in favor 
of diversity. Much like the British, while the government displays strong levels of 
support for Turkish membership, the public is more ambivalent. This ambivalence is 
may be caused by the recent crises of multiculturalism and the rise in popularity of 
right-wing populism. 
129 Eurobarometer 71, Spring 2009. 
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Chapter 5: Multiculturalism and the EU
“Culture is all the dreams and labour tending towards forging humanity. Culture  
requests a paradoxical pact: diversity must be the principle of unity, taking stock of  
differences is necessary not to divide, but to enrich culture even more. Europe is a  
culture or it is not.”130 
5.1. The Debate on Multiculturalism at the Supranational Level - Is there an EU 
level policy?
While there is no EU level policy on culture, it certainly plays a major role in 
Europe.131 EU member states do not harmonize their cultural legislation and there is no 
supranational policy on multiculturalism or issues related to it. However, the EU does 
sponsor many programs and initiatives that are related to culture, multiculturalism, 
intercultural dialogue, and cultural diversity with the aim of building an “ever closer 
union”. The EU has also slowly been expanding its role in the area of immigration and 
integration of third-country nationals, as they are referred to in EU documents, working 
toward a common European policy. 
The lack of a common policy on multiculturalism means that member states are 
free to pursue their own policies in this area, as has been described in the previous 
chapters. As such, European citizens and politicians have varying and often opposing 
viewpoints on the idea of European culture and just how diverse Europe should be. 
Many of the programs implemented by the EU in this area attempt to forge a common 
European culture and identity and stress the importance of intercultural dialogue and 
130 Denis de Rougemont.
131European states also cooperate in the field of culture within the Council of Europe. 
The 1955 Cultural Convention provides the legal framework for cooperation in this 
area. For more information see http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/default_en.asp. 
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diversity in Europe. After all, the motto of the EU is, “unity in diversity”. 
This chapter will explore the debate on multiculturalism in the EU. First, the 
basis of cooperation on cultural issues will be discussed and a few of the programs and 
initiatives in this area will be looked at. Then, the declarations of EU officials and the 
perception of the European public on the issue of culture and also regarding the Turkish 
bid to join the EU will be examined. The EU, while partly also an experiment in 
multiculturalism, lacks an EU level policy on multiculturalism. As a result, the member  
states have enacted different policies stemming from their historical experiences.
5.1.1. The Legal Basis of Multiculturalism in the EU Treaties
5.1.1.1. Culture 
While the original aim of what is now the EU was economic, the 1957 Rome 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) did set the goal of 
developing an “ever-closer union” among the people of Europe. For the next three 
decades, Europe grew closer, mainly economically, as the single market developed. As 
the single market neared completion, the European Community (EC) began to take 
interest in cultural areas as well. In the mid 1980s it adopted the twelve star flag, “Ode 
to Joy” as the anthem, and designated May 9 as 'Europe Day'. These measures are 
viewed as contributing to a wider European identity. In addition, the Erasmus exchange 
program began in the 1980s and is extolled for its contributions to intercultural dialogue 
and understanding. The EU also sponsored conferences and meetings on culture in the 
1980s, and the Council of Ministers launched the European Capital of Culture program 
in 1985, with Athens selected as the first capital. The goal of this program is to, “show 
off the cultural richness and diversity of the European cultures and to celebrate those 
ties which link Europeans together.”132In order to be designated a European Capital of 
Culture, candidate cities must, “present the role they have played in European culture, 
their links with Europe, their European identity.”133 It is important to note that Istanbul 
132 European Union, European Capital of Culture. Accessed July 24, 2010. 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc413_en.htm.
133 Ibid.
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was designated a 2010 European Capital of Culture, along with Essen and Pecs. The 
efforts made in the 1980s by the EC to celebrate different cultures were substantial 
considering that cooperation in this area was not yet an official competency, 
demonstrating the importance of multiculturalism to the EC.
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 contains several references to culture and 
diversity, i.e. multiculturalism. The foreword to the treaty draws attention to the 
solidarity between the European people as well as the importance of respecting national 
cultures and resolves to continue the process of creating an “ever closer union”. With 
the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, immigration policy and residency 
policy became matters of common interest (Article K.1). 
Furthermore, contribution to the “flowering of the cultures of the Member 
States” (Article 3/128) became a Community activity. Article 128 of the Treaty on the 
European Union laid out the competencies of the EU in the realm of culture. While 
calling for contributions to the flowering of national cultures, the treaty also stresses 
respect for national and regional diversity and the advancement of the “common cultural 
heritage.” This is not an area of common policy; rather, the Community encourages 
cooperation between the member states and supplements and supports their actions in 
specific areas: “improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and 
history of the European peoples; conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of 
European significance” (Article 128(2)). The Community was also instructed to 
incorporate cultural aspects into other areas of competence. This article, unchanged, is 
now Article 167 in the Lisbon Treaty. 
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty revision added to this, requiring the Community to 
“respect and promote the diversity of its cultures” (Article 128(4)). It also called for the 
establishment of common measures related to immigration policy (Article 73k). The 
Lisbon Treaty, in its preamble, notes the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe” and makes reference to universal values: freedom, democracy, equality and the 
rule of law. It also, like the previous treaties, aims to deepen the solidarity between 
people while respecting their cultures and traditions. Moreover, Article 3 requires 
respect for the Union's “rich cultural and linguistic diversity [and] Europe's cultural 
heritage.” 
In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is now in effect following 
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the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, restates the common values mentioned above 
and also reiterates the respect for the diversity and traditions of the European people and 
their national identities. It also, much like the national constitutions do, provides for the 
right to freedom of religion, in public or in private (Article 10) and forbids 
discrimination in the usual areas (Article 21). Article 22 states that the Union shall 
respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity. The Charter now has the same legal 
value as the treaties, but it should be noted that the UK has opted out from the Charter. 
While the role of culture in the EU is not as prominent as the role of the common 
market, it certainly has influenced and inspired many different programs. The Erasmus 
exchange program and the European Capital of Culture designation were two early 
examples of this as were the several other programs related to culture that the EU 
introduced in the late 1990s.
The motto of the Union, “unity in diversity” was adopted in the year 2000 and 
the rest of the decade saw programs and initiatives to that effect. The Education and 
Culture Directorate General prepares proposals in this area. The 2007 Agenda for 
Culture, which runs until 2013, aims to encourage cultural diversity and intercultural 
dialogue, promoting cultural as a catalyst for creativity, and recognizing culture as a key 
component in the Union's international relations.134 Likewise, the EU's Culture Program, 
with a budget of €400 million, seeks to celebrate Europe's culture diversity while 
enhancing the shared cultural heritage. Cross-border mobility and dialogue are key in 
realizing these goals, and intercultural dialogue is promoted at all levels.135
In line with the goals of the treaties, culture has been incorporated into other 
policies as well: the Youth in Action program, the Leader+ Initiative, and the EU 
citizenship program.136 Besides these programs and initiatives, EU also declared 2008 
the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The purpose of this was both to help raise 
awareness of the importance of intercultural dialogue, particularly for young people, as 
134 European Union, the European Commission, Education and Culture DG, “The 
European Agenda for Culture,” Accessed July 24, 2010: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-
policy-development/doc399_en.htm. 
135 European Union, the European Commission, Education and Culture DG, “Culture 
Programme,” Accessed July 24, 2010: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-
actions/doc411_en.htm. 
136 European Union, the European Commission, Education and Culture DG, “Culture 
in other EU policies,” Accessed July 24, 2010: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-
development/doc405_en.htm.
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well as to create an atmosphere of tolerance and respect. All of these programs and 
initiatives demonstrate the importance of culture to the Union. Culture is not only 
important inside the borders of the EU, but outside as well: culture plays a major role in 
the EU's relations with third parties, especially with candidate countries. Alignment with 
the acquis communautaire includes cultural aspects, namely ratifying the 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions137, which Turkey has signed but has not yet ratified. Culture, along with 
education, comprises the 26th chapter of accession criteria. 
While there is not a common policy in this area, and it is unlikely that there will  
be one in the future, culture still plays a prominent role in the EU's activities. As a result, 
the member states have been able to follow their own policies in this area. It should be 
noted that the EU's cultural policy is criticized for being contradictory, in that it  
celebrates diversity while also advancing a common European identity.138
5.1.1.2. Immigration and integration
Immigration policy and residency policy became matters of common interest in 
the Maastricht Treaty (Article K.1). The EU has been trying to design a common policy 
for several years and has made some progress in the area, but still falls short of its goal. 
The Lisbon Treaty, for the first time, makes mention of the integration of third-country 
nationals, noting that the European Parliament and the Council may support the member 
states in this area (Article 79(4)). As there is not yet a common policy on immigration 
and integration, the member states are free to enact their own policies in this area. 
However, some common principles and guidelines have been developed to aid them in 
doing so. 
 Over the past few years, the EU has made some progress in this area. A 2003 
Communication from the Commission recalls the EU's commitment to work together in 
the realm of Justice and Home Affairs (Amsterdam Treaty) and the conclusions of the 
137 European Union, the European Commission, Education and Culture DG, “Culture 
in EU Enlargement,” Accessed July 24, 2010:  http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-
development/doc1743_en.htm. 
138 See for example, Bozoki, 2006; Shore, 2006. 
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Tampere European Council (October 1999) asked for more aggressive integration 
policy-making. The Commission stressed the two-way process of integration and 
requested that immigrants be able to keep their own identities. The Commission also 
implored the political leaders to set an example with, “positive attitudes toward 
immigration and promotion of pluralistic societies.”139
The basic common principles for immigrant integration policy were established 
in the Hague Program of November 2004. Noting the many benefits that immigration 
brings to the member states, the European Council's conclusions mention the crucial 
role of the member states' institutions and point out that integration policy is the 
responsibility of the member states. The failure to develop an effective integration 
policy can have adverse implications not only for the member state, but also for the 
other member states and the Union as a whole. Integration is to be a two-way process 
and must respect the basic values of the EU. Employment is emphasized, in that it 
increases both the participation of immigrants in society and the contributions that they 
make to society. Basic knowledge of the host country's language, history, and 
institutions is essential, and the member states should help immigrants obtain this 
knowledge. Along the same lines, education and access to institutions, goods, and 
services can help immigrants to integrate. The Council conclusions also draw attention 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights which protects diverse cultures and religions and 
advises that these practices be safeguarded. These conclusions were adopted in 2005 as 
the Common Agenda for Integration.140
In addition, the European Fund for the Integration of Third-country nationals 
was set up in January 2007 to support the efforts of the member states and facilitate the 
integration of immigrants in line with the basic principles. The Fund encourages 
member states to develop their own programs in this area.141 Both the common 
principles and the Fund recognize that the member states have different integration 
139 European Union, European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, EP, European Economic and Social Committee and the Commission of the 
Regions on Immigration, Integration and Employment,” COM/2003/0336. 
140 European Union, Communication from the Commission, “A Common Agenda for 
Integration – Framework for the Integration of Third-country Nationals in the EU,” 
COM/2005/0389.
141 European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, “The European Fund for the Integration 
of Third-country Nationals,” Accessed July 25, 2010: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/integration/funding_integration_en.htm. 
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regimes and encourage the sharing of best practices while empowering the immigrants. 
To conclude, it can be determined that the EU maintains an active presence in 
issues related to multiculturalism: cultural matters, immigration and integration. It is  
unlikely, due to the national sensitivity of the issue, that an EU level policy related to 
culture will be adopted. That being said, it should not be forgotten that, while not 
explicitly defined, the “common cultural heritage” of the Union is referred to in many 
official documents. This is significant in that it often used as a reason why Turkey 
should be excluded from the EU. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty draws attention to the 
“cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe,” which, while not directly 
referring to the prominence of Christianity in Europe, implicitly suggests those who do 
not share in these traditions fall outside of the scope of the Union, despite the fact that 
the borders of Europe have not be defined by the EU. Now that the legal basis of the 
issues related to multiculturalism has been looked at, the statements made by major EU 
officials in this area will be discussed. 
5.1.2. The Declarations of EU Officials’ on Multiculturalism
Many high-level EU officials have addressed the topic of multiculturalism in 
their speeches. The majority of them, based on an analysis of the text of their recent 
speeches, embrace and value the diversity of Europe. At the same time, some refer to the 
shared roots of Europe. Reference to the motto of the EU, “unity in diversity”, is also a 
common theme. José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, made a 
speech in November 2004 on “Europe and Culture.” In this speech, Barroso drew 
attention to the motto, noting that it is both “reassuring and ambitious”142 in that it 
acknowledges the diversity of Europe while implying that it is possible to unite the 
continent based on the recognition of this diversity. According to Barroso, the motto 
commits the EU to establishing, “the richness of our diversity as a structural element of 
our unity.”143 A few years later, in November 2006, Barroso's perspective seemed to shift 
slightly. While still expressing admiration for European diversity, he also brought a 
142 José Manuel Barroso, "Europe and Culture," Berliner Konferenz für europäische 
Kulturpolitik, Berlin, 26 November 2004.  
143 Ibid.
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cultural dimension into the speech which discussed the common deep roots and values 
that unite Europeans, noting that “Europe is an eminently cultural invention.” Still, he 
emphasized the diverse people and cultures of Europe: “Yes, deep roots are important, 
but it is also important to recognize that modern Europeans are grafted onto many 
different roots, based on many different peoples and cultures that came before us.”144 In 
a later speech, in February 2007, Barroso stressed the importance of religious and 
cultural pluralism in Europe, highlighting the importance of intercultural dialogue as a 
way to “enrich our unity.”145
Other EU officials have made similar speeches. At the Conference of European 
Imams in 2006, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations 
and European Neighborhood Policy, underlined the cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity of Europe while emphasizing the common roots of the different civilizations. 
She supports a more multiculturalist view of integration, in which immigrants do not 
have to sacrifice any of their beliefs or values: “It [is not] a question of assimilation or 
of any community giving up core beliefs and values which are close to their heart.” 
Franco Frattini, former Vice-President in the Barroso Commission and Commissioner 
for Justice, Freedom and Security, while agreeing that a multicultural and diverse 
society is beneficial, prefers a slightly more integrationist view: “European societies are 
multicultural and multi-ethnic, and their diversity is a positive and enriching factor...we 
must promote the values of freedom and solidarity, most of all, through an active policy 
of cultural integration.”146 
The speeches discussed here show that EU officials generally, at least in their 
rhetoric, praise diversity and multiculturalism. For most officials, recognizing Europe's 
shared roots is important, but they also acknowledge that the shared heritage has 
evolved from a heterogeneous group of cultures and people. In order for this diverse 
group to live together, the officials suggest that the shared roots and common heritage of 
Europe must act as a unifying factor. The officials vary in their degree of support for 
multiculturalism, but all seem to favor the kind of Europe that European Parliament 
President Jerzy Buzek once described,  “There is no 'us' and 'you'. We can say loud and 
144 José Manuel Barroso, “A Soul for Europe,” Berlin, 17 November 2006. 
145 José Manuel Barroso, “ On the occasion of the inaugural speech of the President of 
the European Parliament,” Strasbourg, 13 February 2007.
146 Franco Frattini, "The Need for a Unified Stance in Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia,” Seminar on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna, 22 June 2006. 
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clear that this Europe belongs to us all.”147  
5.2 Declarations of EU Officials on Turkey
The EU officials' speeches on multiculturalism are generally supportive of 
multiculturalism. They recognize Europe's shared roots and also its diversity. While the 
EU officials more or less uniformly support multiculturalism in the EU, the opinions are 
more divided on the topic of Turkish membership. The EU institutions routinely 
reaffirm their support for Turkish accession and praise the reforms that have been made 
in Turkey. They stress the need for Turkey to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria and 
emphasize that Turkey and the EU are working toward the mutual goal of accession.148 
Various EU officials, speaking on behalf of the Union, have also voiced their desire to 
see Turkey become a full member of the EU. 
Gunter Verheugen, a former EU Commissioner from Germany, described 
Turkey's historic connection with Europe, noting that Turkey's European identity was 
not called into question in the past: “it was beyond any doubt that Turkey belonged to 
the free part of Europe, when it joined the Council of Europe in 1949.”149 Verheugen 
recalled that the European mission, as laid out in the Treaties, is to “overcome the 
divisions of Europe;”150 however, according to him, without Turkey this cannot be 
accomplished. He brought up the selection of Istanbul as a 2010 European Capital of 
Culture as an opportunity to work towards “better mutual understanding.” He described 
this event as, “a great opportunity to represent Turkey in all its rich diversity.”151 
Verheugen embraces diversity and emphasizes the contributions that Turkey would 
make to the EU:
Turkey will make Europe stronger. The membership of Turkey in the EU would 
demonstrate that a country with a Muslim population can fully share our 
European values and objectives... I believe the ultimate accession of Turkey to 
147 Jerzy Buzek, “Inaugural Speech,” Strasbourg, 14 July 2009: 
148 See, for example, European Commission, “EU to Reaffirm its Commitment to 
Turkey at Istanbul Meeting,” 12 July 2010. 
149 Günter Verheugen, “Turkey belongs to Europe,” TUSIAD, on the occasion of the 
award of the Bosphorus Prize for European Understanding, Ankara, 19 January 2007.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
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the European Union will strengthen tolerance in Europe and worldwide and will 
be understood as a strong signal that Europe is mastering its diversity and turns it 
into opportunities to the benefit of mankind.152
Clearly a supporter of multiculturalism, Verheugen sees the value in Turkish 
membership much like Barroso does. 
Barroso, while addressing the Turkish Grand National Assembly in April 2008, 
also brought up the history of the relationship between Turkey and Europe. Barroso 
provided an apt example which summarizes the history: 
The Ottoman Empire was always a key actor in European politics. Its role on our 
continent was self-evident, including for the world of arts: in his giant painting 
The Wedding Feast at Cana in 1563, the famous Venetian painter Paolo Veronese 
depicted among the guests around the table the main European leaders of the 
time. Suleiman the Magnificent sits naturally at the same table as Emperor 
Charles V and François I of France, amongst others.153 
Cooperation between Turkey and European continued, and following World War II 
Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe and NATO. Like Verheugen, 
Barroso agrees that Turkish membership would be, “a major asset in promoting dialogue 
between civilizations and religions.”154
Similarly, Commissioner Olli Rehn, who previously held the position of 
Commissioner for Enlargement, has on several occasions addressed the debate on 
Turkish enlargement. Rehn conveyed his distaste for those who oppose Turkish 
membership of the grounds of culture and religious differences, declaring that: 
The EU is not a Christian Club. Rather it is a community of common values, 
democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms. If a country meets those 
conditions, it should be able to join the EU – if it is a European country and it 
has a European vocation.155
Rehn also addressed concerns of some member states, particularly France, oppose 
enlargement as it will increase immigration and add to the already high levels of 
unemployment. In an attempt to reassure those concerned about an influx of Turkish 
152 Ibid.
153 Jose Manuel Barroso, “Turkey: Master of the Straits, Master of its Destiny,” Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, Ankara, 10 April 2008.
154 Ibid.
155 Interview with Olli Rehn, 21 November 2008. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/commissioner-rehn-am-just-factory-
manager/article-177381.
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immigrants, Rehn reiterated the October 2004 Commission opinion and the Negotiating 
Framework of 2005 which allows for transitional periods and possibly even permanent 
derogations on the free movement of workers in order to alleviate fears related to 
immigration.
In sum, EU officials generally adhere to the official position on Turkish 
membership:  Turkey is to be judged solely on the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Any attempt to bring Turkey's cultural or religious identity in to the equation at the EU 
level is inappropriate. Even the French government, famous for its staunch opposition to 
Turkish membership, adopted a more conciliatory tone toward Turkish accession during 
their six months in the European Council presidency in the second half of 2008: two 
more chapters (free movement of capital and information, society and media) were 
opened for negotiations during the French Presidency, despite their record of aversion 
toward Turkey. Therefore, it can be concluded that the debate over Turkish membership 
at the EU level is much more subdued and there stronger levels of support for 
multiculturalism at the EU level stemming from the treaty obligations. While 
disparaging a candidate country is unacceptable at the EU level, it certainly takes place 
at the national level, leading to the conclusion that the pro-Turkey position of the EU 
has little impact at the national level. 
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Chapter Six: Multiculturalism and Turkish Accession 
“On television, Turkey means minarets, headscarves and the Bosphorus bridge.”156
This chapter aims to synthesize the findings of the previous chapters and will 
show that the Turkish bid to join the EU has been impacted by the differing positions of 
the member states on multiculturalism. As there is no EU level policy in this area, 
member states have developed their own policies related to multiculturalism. The 
absence of a supranational policy is reflected onto the varying positions the member 
states have taken on Turkish accession to the EU. First, a brief history of the relationship 
between Turkey and Europe will be given and the arguments against Turkish accession 
which are related to multiculturalism will be reviewed. Finally, the situations in the UK, 
France and the Netherlands will be analyzed and conclusions will be made. 
6.1. The Impact of the Debate on Multiculturalism on the Turkish 
Candidacy
6.1.1. The Relationship Between Turkey and Europe
Turkey and Europe share a long history. The Ottoman Empire helped to form the 
idea of “Europe”, in that Europe was constructed with the Ottoman Turks as Europe's 
“other”, the common external enemy which united Christian Europe (Goffman, 2002). 
Following the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into continental Europe in the sixteenth 
century, the Ottomans suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of Vienna in 1683, 
marking the beginning of the end for the Empire. This battle has become a point of 
156 Paul Taylor, Reuters’ European affairs editor, quoted in Katinka Barysch, “What 
Europeans Think and Why” Centre for European Reform.
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reference for those looking to keep Turkey out of the EU. 
During the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began to play an 
important role for Europe. The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1856 to end the Crimean War, 
guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire which was 
now regarded as a crucial part of the European system of states. More importantly, the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris as well as the characterization of the Ottoman Empire as 
“the sick man of Europe” indicate that as early as the mid-nineteenth century the 
Ottoman Empire was considered to be an important member of Europe. At this time, the 
geographical location of Turkey did not preclude it from being treated as part of Europe. 
Following World War I, the Turkish Republic, founded by Mustafa Kemal in 
1923, continued to show the Turks' determination to be part of Europe. The secular 
Turkish Republic was modeled on the institutions and constitutions of various Western 
European states, and Turkey was keen to align itself with Europe following World War 
II. A founding member of the United Nations and a member of NATO and the Council 
of Europe, Turkey's role in Europe seemed to be cemented. 
Turkey moved to deepen its ties with Europe in the 1950s after the EEC was set 
up. Following Greece, Turkey applied for membership in the EEC in 1959. The EEC 
responded to Turkey's application not by questioning its eligibility but by calling in 
question its readiness. The EEC thus created the option of Associate Membership in 
order to deal with applicants who were not yet prepared to handle membership. In 1963, 
the Ankara Agreement was signed between Ankara and the EEC with the aim of 
establishing a customs union between Turkey and the EEC, bringing about closer ties. 
According to Article 28, once Turkey meets the obligations that are laid out in the 
Agreement, both Ankara and what was then the EEC shall examine “the possibility of 
the accession of Turkey to the Community.”157 Here again, the issue was readiness and 
the onus was on Turkey to meet the required obligations. Culture, religion and 
geography were not factors. 
Turkey applied for full membership to the EC in 1987 on the basis of Article 237 
of the founding Rome Treaty which stipulates that any European state can apply for 
membership. The European Commission responded to the Turkish application by 
reconfirming that Turkey was eligible for membership. This was in contrast to the 
157 European Economic Community. “Ankara Agreement, September 1, 1963.” 
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Commission's reply to Morocco's 1987 application in which Morocco was declared 
ineligible for membership on the grounds that it was not part of Europe. While Morocco 
was dismissed for lying outside the borders of Europe, Turkey, on the other hand, was 
reaffirmed as being entitled to membership once ready. The question of Turkey being 
outside Europe, or being culturally or religiously different, were again not issues at this 
time. Instead of immediately opening negotiations with Turkey, the EC called for more 
integration and the completion of the customs union. The delay in opening negotiations 
was not related to Turkey's differences or location, but rather had to do with the EU not 
being in the position to deal with enlargement at that time due to its preoccupation with 
the single market. 
The breakthrough on the Turkish path toward membership came in 1999 when 
the Helsinki European Council declared Turkey an official candidate for membership on 
equal footing with the other candidates. The Laeken European Council in 2001 likewise 
proclaimed Turkey to be a part of the EU's future and supported its participation in the 
Convention on the Future of Europe. Turkey's relationship with the EU further 
intensified when negotiations were officially opened in October 2005. Turkey is 
currently in the process of adapting its laws to meet the acquis communautaire, a 
process which has encountered some difficulties as some of the thirty-five chapters 
which must be closed in order for Turkey to move forward to the process of accession 
negotiations have been vetoed or blocked by those member states who are resistant to 
Turkish membership. The next section will bring together the findings of the previous 
chapters and show that the lack of an EU level policy on multiculturalism is reflected 
onto the Turkish bid to join the EU in that the member states. 
6.1.2. Multiculturalism, the Member States, and Turkish Membership
The section will pull together the material in the previous chapters and look at 
how the different versions of multiculturalism found in the member states, which they 
have been able to implement as there is no supranational policy, are reflected onto the 
positions of the UK, France, and the Netherlands on Turkish accession. The examination 
of the different approaches to multiculturalism has determined that a connection at the 
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national level between the approach to multiculturalism and the position on Turkish 
enlargement can be made. The member states have been able to employ different 
systems of multiculturalism since there is no EU level policy in this area. It is important 
to note that there are many differences between these member states, their experiences 
and history, and the type of policies they employ. For example, their colonial 
experiences are different, some have a greater immigrant population, and the the 
demographic makeup of their non-immigrant population vary considerably. These are 
just a few factors which may explain the differing approaches to multiculturalism. 
The member states which enacted multicultural policies (the UK and the 
Netherlands) support Turkish membership. On the other hand, France, whose approach 
to its diverse population can be labeled as assimilationist, does not support membership. 
Of course, these findings are in no way a rule as this thesis only looked at three cases. In 
order for a theory to be developed in this area, an analysis of the experiences of all the 
member states in the EU with multiculturalism should be undertaken. 
6.1.2.1. The United Kingdom
The British experience with multiculturalism has impacted the position of the 
British government on Turkish membership in the EU. The UK has employed a unique 
system of multiculturalism in which minorities are given full equal rights, putting them 
on equal footing with the majority.158 This is in line with the practice of multiculturalism 
which consists of the coexistence of different groups in one society. The British system 
of multiculturalism was influenced by British history and was allowed to develop on its 
own due to the lack of EU level legislation in this area. The UK has a long tradition of 
dealing with different cultures and not only tolerates diversity but also values and 
respects it, allowing immigrants to maintain their distinctiveness. The laissez-faire 
approach to multiculturalism in Britain has led to Turkish membership not being a 
source of contention as it has been in France. The British view is that the diversity 
created by immigrants enriches life. This, coupled with the tradition of fighting racism 
158 However, this analysis is based on a literal reading of the legislation and speeches 
of politicians related to these issues. Whether or not these policies are actually 
practiced as written is an important issue and should be explored in further research. 
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and discrimination, has contributed to the formation of the government's position that 
Turkish membership would add to the EU's strengths. 
As the attitude toward the immigrants who arrived in the UK following World 
War began to change, race - not culture, religion, or ethnicity - became an issue. This is 
important for the Turkish case. While other countries point out Turkey's cultural and 
religious differences, the British system did not make these differences a major issue in 
Britain and thus they are not much of an issue with Turkey. The British government has 
a history of fighting discrimination and prejudice, and believes (in theory) that every 
culture has a right to exist. This may be why more British people tend to think that 
Turkey has the same values as Europe. The British predilection for supporting diversity 
has effected its position on Turkey in that it views Turkey membership as enhancing the 
'unity in diversity' in the EU. 
The British experience with multiculturalism has contributed to the support for 
Turkish membership in the EU. The government has a long history of supporting equal 
rights and implementing anti-discrimination measures thus influencing in its view on 
Turkey. The government has been allowed to enact such measures since there is no EU 
policy in these areas. Therefore, the British experience with multiculturalism is different 
from, for example, the French experience. The different experiences are have influenced 
the member states positions on Turkish membership. Like the British government, the 
public as well prefers an atmosphere of tolerance and diversity. The British system of 
multiculturalism has been instrumental in developing the British position on Turkey.
6.1.2.2. France
The French experience with multiculturalism is tied to the French position on 
Turkish accession. As there is no supranational legislation with which France has to 
comply in this area, the French have been able to enact a different approach to deal with 
their diverse population. This approach is more assimilatory than multicultural and is 
reflected in the French government's position on Turkish accession. However, the 
French public does not share the same strong opinions of the government on this issue. 
While race relations has been the prevailing issue in the UK, in France it is unity. 
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Unlike the British and the Dutch, the French do not recognize ethnicity, race, or religion 
in an attempt to promote unity, equality, and to avoid conflict. At first this would seem 
to imply that the French should therefore support Turkish membership – if they cannot 
categorize them as being different – but this has not been the case as detailed above. 
Instead, the concept of the mission civilisatrice influenced the preference for 
assimilating French residents which has been, in theory, the guiding principle. In an 
effort to create a united France, the French government has, somewhat forcefully at 
times, encouraged monoculturalism and assimilation through the spread of the French 
language and the republican ideals. The republican values which grew out of the 
revolution (secularism, equality, legal freedom, fraternity, patriotism) still represent the  
essence of France today. The French, more than the Dutch or the British, view Turkish 
values as being different than European values. Turkey, in the eyes of the French 
government, does not subscribe to these important values, particularly secularism and 
equality. 
Furthermore, the French government, having faced a good deal of trouble 
recently with its immigrant population, fears, much like the British, an influx of Turkish 
workers. This would mean another, presumably large and different, group of immigrants 
to turn into Frenchmen. French immigration policies have turned even more restrictive 
(with the introduction of DNA tests and a contract agreeing to the French way of life) as 
have the longstanding open citizenship laws with the revocation of jus soli. The French 
preference for monoculturalism, which extends to the EU level, leaves little room for 
Turkey. The strong emphasis on linguistic, political, and cultural assimilation of the 
immigrants in France has contributed to the French government's opposition to Turkish 
membership. Since there is no EU level policy on multiculturalism, immigration or 
integration, the French have been able to implement their own policies in these areas. 
Their more exclusionary and assimilatory nature is reflected in the French government's 
opposition to Turkish membership. 
The French people do not share the same strong levels of opposition that the 
government displays. While generally adverse to all enlargement, and particularly 
Turkish enlargement, the French appear to be more supportive of multiculturalism, 
tolerance, and diversity that the government issue. This may explain why almost as 
many people who think Turkish membership is a bad thing are undecided about it. 
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In conclusion, it can be said that the unique French preference for assimilation, 
which has  developed due to the the fact that multiculturalism is not an EU level 
competence, has impacted its opposition to Turkish membership. The Turks are viewed 
as being too different and not subscribing to the same values and are thus not European 
enough. The French generally prefer a monocultural society and the Turks would 
damage that. The French system of assimilation has fostered their hostility to Turkey.  
6.1.2.3. The Netherlands
The Netherlands was once admired for its tolerance and immigrant-friendly 
policies which it could implement as these are member state rather than EU level 
competences. However, it has recently been plagued with several crises and has begun 
to employ measures to facilitate civic integration. This is somewhat similar to the 
British experience, although it can be said that the Dutch were, based on their policies, 
friendlier toward the newcomers. In spite of the turn toward civic integration, 
government support for Turkish membership remains strong and the Dutch people, 
when compared to the average European, are more in favor as well. The support for 
Turkish membership can be explained by its benevolent approach to the newcomers in 
the Netherlands. 
The Dutch approach to its immigrant population is much closer to the British 
system than the French. The Dutch, influenced by their own domestic diversity, 
employed a policy of multiculturalism which was based on their pillar system. This 
progressive system encouraged the newcomers to maintain their native identities and 
granted them many rights, such as voting rights, dual citizenship for a period of time 
and expanded jus soli citizenship. While some of these policies have since been reneged, 
they have impacted both the Dutch government and the public which is well known for 
its tolerance. This tolerance has been extended to Turkey as well, with most Dutch 
politicians (Geert Wilders being an exception) calling for the Turkish case to be treated 
fairly and without prejudice to Turkey's differences.
Despite the growing anti-immigrant sentiment in the 2000s and the several 
'crises of multiculturalism', the government has remained supportive of Turkish 
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membership, believing, much like the UK, that Turkey's diversity would be a benefit to 
the Union and that any mention of religion or culture is equal to discrimination. Unlike 
France and the UK, for the Dutch government the possibility of Turkish immigration is 
not treated as a major issue. The Dutch, due to their generally positive experience with 
the newcomers and their open approach toward them, recognize that the safeguard 
clauses will protect them, if necessary, from a flood of Turkish immigrants. As expected, 
the Dutch people as well are more supportive of both multiculturalism and also Turkish 
membership than the average European and share similar levels of support with the 
British. For the Dutch, adherence to the Copenhagen Criteria is crucial, as they wish to 
see Turkey treated fairly. However, perhaps due to the rise in popularity of Wilders, 
more Dutch are starting to question if Turkish values are in line with Western values. 
In sum, it can be said that the unique Dutch approach to multiculturalism, which 
developed both due to the lack of an EU level policy as well as due to the Dutch 
experience with diversity, has created a community of tolerance which wishes to see 
Turkey treated fairly in its bid for membership. The government is an advocate of 
Turkish membership and the public is more supportive than the average European as 
well. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that the support or hostility toward Turkish membership is 
linked to domestic experiences with multiculturalism. The member states examined 
have employed decidedly different approaches to multiculturalism. They have been able 
to do so as multiculturalism (along with immigration and integration) are member state,  
rather than EU level, competences. 
The issue of multiculturalism particularly stands out in the Turkish case. This is 
mainly due to the experiences of the member states in dealing with their immigrant and 
minority populations. In addition, the recent crises of multiculturalism in the member 
states (such as the headscarf issue, riots, assassinations, and terrorist attacks) have 
brought the issue of cultural and religious differences to the forefront. However, these 
crises have affected the member states in different ways, primarily due to the internal 
circumstances in the member state. France, for example, was more impact by its minor 
crises than the Netherlands was by the two assassinations. This difference can be 
attributed to the predilection for tolerance and equal treatment in the Netherlands which 
does not play as big of a role in France. Because of these experiences, in some member 
states, Turkey's cultural and religious differences have become more important than 
compliance with the other accession criteria. While multiculturalism is indeed a concern 
on its own, as is immigration, it is magnified in the case of Turkey due to the links that 
have been made between the cultural and religious differences of the immigrants in the 
member states to Turkey's differences. 
This thesis has established a connection between the type of multicultural 
regimes employed in three of the member states and the government position on Turkish 
membership. The reason that different types of regimes are found within the EU is that 
the EU does not have competency in these areas. Therefore, the member states are free 
to pursue their own policies. The member states which have implemented more 
multicultural policies (the UK and the Netherlands) are staunch supporters of Turkey at 
the governmental level whereas the member state that has enacted a more assimilationist  
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policy (France) is strongly opposed to Turkish membership. However, the government 
and the public do not always see eye to eye on these issues. 
Figure 20: Turkey's Membership in the EU
In general, the British and Dutch governments embrace diversity and while they 
have recently moved to more civic integration regimes, this does not mean that they are 
opposed to multiculturalism. Instead, it demonstrates that they abide by the motto of the 
EU, “unity in diversity”. Civic integration practices have been implemented in these 
member states in order to better deal with the criticism and crises of multiculturalism. In 
trying to create a citizenry that subscribes to universal values while still allowing them 
to maintain their distinctiveness, the UK and the Netherlands have displayed their 
openness to and toleration of diversity which is evident in their government level 
speeches in support of Turkey. 
On the other hand, France, which has employed a decidedly more assimilationist 
integration regime, remains staunchly opposed to Turkish membership. Therefore, a 
connection can be made between more assimilationist policies and opposition to Turkish 
enlargement. The French desire to create a monocultural population based on French 
republican values puts it at odds with Turkey, which is considered by the French to not 
be part of Europe, both geographically and with regards to its values. 
While a connection between the position on Turkish membership and the 
domestic experiences with multiculturalism can be made at the governmental level, a  
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weak relationship exists at the societal level. The British and Dutch can be categorized 
as more supportive of Turkish membership than the French. However, there is no clear 
connection related to the levels of support for multiculturalist measures and diversity 
and tolerance in public opinion and the position on Turkey.  
In conclusion, this thesis has tried to show that the combination of the lack of an 
EU level policy on multiculturalism along with the domestic challenges of 
multiculturalism have been reflected onto the debate surrounding the Turkish bid to join 
the EU. It has been determined, although based only on a study of three member states, 
that there is a relationship between the approach to multiculturalism and the position on 
Turkey at the governmental level. The member states which enacted multiculturalist  
policies (the UK and the Netherlands) are supportive of Turkish membership in the EU, 
whereas the state that has employed more assimilationist policies (France) is not. 
However, it cannot be said that there is a connection at the societal level.
It is recommended that more research be conducted in this area. Several 
questions remain: While a connection between the multicultural regimes employed in 
three member states and their position on Turkey has been made, does this connection 
stand when all twenty-seven member states are taken into account? Has the recent 
addition of civic integration policies affected the position on Turkey? At the societal  
level, how can the ambivalence toward Turkey membership be explained? How have the 
right-wing parties affected public opinion on multiculturalism and on Turkish 
membership? A more in depth look into these remaining questions will allow better 
conclusions and connections to be made.
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